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Introduction
There is a paradox in current proposals for law reform in the field
of complex litigation. Numerous authorities have proposed the transfer of mass tort cases, such as those that concern mass disasters and
widely distributed product injuries,1 from dispersed state and federal

trial courts to consolidated proceedings in the federal district courts.
These authorities include the American Law Institute, 2 the American
Bar Association,3 the House Judiciary Committee,4 the Federal
Courts Study Committee,5 and leading academics. 6 The paradox is
1. No more elaborate definition of "mass tort cases" will be offered here. The term
covers at least the cases that arise from a single-incident disaster in which there are many
victims, such as a plane crash, and those that arise from a defective product that injures
many people. It may also cover cases that arise from environmental contamination of a
single site. See generally 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERO ON CLAss ACrIONS § 17.06
(2d ed. 1985). Some of the proposals discussed in this Article furnish their own definitions.
A recent law review article contains an exhaustive review of the definition of complex
litigation. Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 1683, 1692-1734 (1992).
2.

AMERICAN LAW INSTrT-rrE, COMPLEx LITIGATION PROJECr ch. 5 (Proposed Final

Draft 1993) [hereinafter ALl].
3.
EGATES
4.
5.

AMERiCAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON MASS TORTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DEL(Nov. 1989) [hereinafter ABA].
H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrEE REPORT 44-45 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC].

6. John McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707
(1976); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 Tx.

L. Rnv. 1039 (1986); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley,

Beyond Diversity: FederalMultiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction,135 U. PA. L. REv. 7 (1986);
see Allen R. Kamp, The Shrinking Forum: The Supreme Court's Limitation of Jurisdiction-An Argument for a Federal Forum in Multi-Party, Multi-State Litigation, 21 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 161 (1979) (supporting statutory provisions for consolidation of multistate
cases in the federal courts). This view, however, is hardly universal among academics. See

Richard A.- Epstein, The Consolidationof Complex Litigation:A CriticalEvaluationof the
ALI Proposal,10 J.L. & COM. 1 (1990) (criticizing consolidated proceedings); Roger H.

Transgrud, Mass Trialsin Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent,U. ILL. L. REv. 69 (1989) (criticizing
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that the federal courts are poorly suited to handle those cases for a
number of readily apparent reasons.
First, though federal district courts are required under the Erie
doctrine 7 to apply state law to these cases, they are unable to contribute to its sensible development and application in the mass tort area.
Any attempt to anticipate changes in state law would be unlikely to
make a positive contribution to legal development because of the
political and popular isolation that marks the institutional perspective
of the federal judiciary. The alternative of ignoring the Erie doctrine
and creating a federal common law of mass tort would violate federalism principles. The policy and constitutional underpinnings of Erie, as
well as the majoritarian character of elected state courts, support the
maintenance of the Erie doctrine in the field of mass torts. Indeed,
most of the major proposals suggest retaining it.8
Second, the federal courts should not allocate their scarce resources of time and effort to mass tort cases, which must be controlled
by state law. The federal courts' expertise lies in interpreting federal
statutory and constitutional provisions. Just as their political isolation
makes federal courts unsuited for developing state tort law, it makes
them the best protectors of individual rights; they should spend their
time on civil rights and other federal law cases.
Several proponents of change recognize these problems in their
proposals for federal consolidation of mass tort actions. 9 They view
some aspects of consolidated proceedings). Various proposals call for use of federal class
action procedures in mass tort cases, a form of consolidation in the federal district courts
that would presumably displace state court individual proceedings. Bruce H. Nielson,
Note, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow
More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 461
(1988); Patricia Zimand, Note, NationalAsbestos Litigation:ProceduralProblems Must Be
Solved, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 899 (1991). Other sources proposing expansion of the federal
class action rules include Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort
Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457 (1989); Note,
Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REv. 1143
(1983) [hereinafter Note, Class Certification]. A source discussing the use of bankruptcy
procedures for mass torts is Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in
Chapter 11 Proceedings,96 HARv. L. Rnv. 1121 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Bankruptcy].
7. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This point is developed further in
text accompanying notes 52-118.
8. ABA, supra note 3, at 29-34 (recommendation that state law apply, but with federal choice of law rule); ALI, supra note 2, ch. 6, at 375 (same); H.R. 3406, § 6 (same);
Rowe & Sibley, supra note 6, at 37 (same); see FCSC, supra note 5, at 45 (not addressing
changes to choice of law rules).
9. ABA, supra note 3, at 29 (noting difficulties of applying state law); ALI, supra
note 2, at 208 (discussing Erie problems and burdens on federal courts in deciding cases
that lack uniquely federal interests), and § 5.01 comment c, at 281-82 (same); FCSC, supra
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them as the price to pay for the important judicial economy advantage
of consolidation.10 But there is an unexamined premise to this reasoning: that consolidation must take place in a federal, as opposed to a
state, forum. 1
State courts are now highly desirable forums to consolidate tort
cases from other states. Barriers to aggregation of cases in state
courts have fallen;' 2 the larger states and many smaller ones have
made changes in rules and practice to handle cases of extreme complexity in an efficient manner. 3
A number of doctrinal developments have facilitated these
changes. State court territorial jurisdiction has broadened.' 4 The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been all but eliminated in Texas
and some other states. 5 Restrictive venue rules have disappeared.' 6
note 5, at 45 (acknowledging workload increase for federal courts); Mullenix, supra note 6,
at 1077 (proposing federal common law of mass tort to avoid pervasive Erie problems in
consolidated product liability actions); Rowe & Sibley, supra note 6, at 45-46 (acknowledging state law basis of cases to be consolidated), 47 (discussing concern about federal docket
congestion). See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles Gardner Geyh, The Case in Support
of Legislation Facilitatingthe Consolidationof Mass-Accident Litigation:A View from the
Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. Rlv. 535, 562 (1990) (noting objection to H.R. 3406 based on the
states' primary responsibility for resolving state law disputes).
10. See sources cited supra note 6.
11. A handful of sources have considered the possibility of consolidation in the state
courts. In 1982, Professor Schroeder advanced a state court consolidation proposal. Elinor
P. Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failureof Nonparty Preclusion and an
Alternative Proposal,67 IowA L. REv. 917 (1982). A 1987 Yale Law Journal note also
brought forward a proposal. George T. Conway I,Note, The Consolidationof Multistate
Litigation in State Courts,96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987). Most recently, Professor Resnick has
noted the possibility of a tribunal composed of the courts of different states to handle mass
tort cases. Judith Resnick, From "Cases" to "Litigation",54 LAw & CoN-EMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1991, at 5, 56. The American Law Institute's consolidation proposal also has a
state court transfer and consolidation component. Finally, the Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws have proposed a uniform state court transfer and consolidation act. Nevertheless, given the number and prominence of proponents of federal consolidation, these voices
are isolated cries in the procedural wilderness. Moreover, none of these proposals (save
Professor Resnick's) appears to view state court consolidation as an alternative to transferring cases from state to federal courts. Either they are adjuncts to federal transfer and
consolidation proposals, or they are conceptualized independently of the federal consolidation movement.
The literature on federal consolidation, on the other hand, is huge. See generally
ABA, supra note 3, at ic-10c (bibliography); Linda S. Mullenix, Selected Bibliography on
Complex Litigation, 10 REv. LrrM. 561-84 (1991) (selected bibliography).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 219-21.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 222-24.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 241-49.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 267-68.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 269-70.
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to identify and expedite cases that are likely
Specific procedures exist
17
complex.
to become
Efforts have already begun to promote transfer and consolidation
in state courts. In 1991, the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
promulgated a uniform act on interstate consolidation;' at least one
state has already adopted it.' 9 The American Law Institute's proposal
for transfer and consolidation of cases in federal courts includes a proposal for interstate consolidation of cases in state courts, 20 and thus
provides an additional model for future developments. So do existing
interstate cooperation statutes, such as the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.2 1 Finally, consolidating mass tort cases in state courts
may be the path of least political resistance in efforts to achieve the
efficiencies of combined treatment of common issues. 22
Nevertheless, some doctrinal problems will hamper any form of
state court consolidation of cases whose complexity comes from interstate injuries or disasters.' Some limits still exist on territorial jurisdiction and venue. No consistent system exists among states to defer
to other states' assertions of jurisdiction, by application of abatement
or abstention. Existing full faith and credit doctrine makes the first
final decision the binding one, and so creates incentives for races to
the courthouse between potential litigants. Litigants may be skeptical
about the impartiality and skill of the judiciary in many states. Each
of these problems has its own solutions, however, and all of them
combined are not as difficult as the problems with federal transfer and
consolidation.
Enhanced consolidation of mass tort cases in state courts could
take one of two forms. In the first form, each state would act independently to strengthen its ability to handle complex tort litigation, increasing its willingness to take jurisdiction of cases filed within its
borders and consolidating them into single proceedings. At the same
time, courts could use door-closing doctrines to discourage the filing
of cases that would detract from the efficiency advantages of larger,
ongoing suits in other states. The second form would be the creation
of an interstate compact and a uniform law in each participating state
17. See infra text accompanying notes 216-18.
18. UNFORM TRANsFER OF LrroATIoN Acr, 14 U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 1992).
19. S.D. H.B. 1337 (enacted Mar. 13, 1992).
20. ALI, supra note 2, at 205, 559.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1993).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 235-39.
23. For discussion of these problems and proposed solutions to them, see infra text
accompanying notes 293-316.
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to permit the voluntary or compulsory transfer of cases filed in one
state to magnet forums handling the consolidated proceedings in another state. Each of the two approaches has merits and demerits.
However, either would be superior to the federal alternative.
This Article explains the difficulties with consolidation of mass
tort cases in the federal courts. It considers the strengths of the state
court alternative, and puts forward solutions to some of the doctrinal
problems that might otherwise impede consolidation of mass tort
cases in state courts. Part I examines the existing proposals for transfer and consolidation of mass tort cases in the federal courts. It catalogs the problems with development of the law under the Erie
doctrine that these proposals would cause. It considers the alternative
of a federal law of mass tort, but explains the damage to federalism
that approach would cause. It then takes up the question of allocating
federal judicial resources to decide mass tort cases. Part II considers
the advantages of consolidation of mass tort cases in state settings:
those stemming from consolidation itself, from state practice developments, and from political considerations. Part III takes up various
doctrinal and practical problems with state court consolidation of
mass torts. On the doctrinal side, it addresses constitutional doubts,
along with the problems of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, choice
of law, and conflicting jurisdiction. On the practical side, it discusses
procedural disuniformities and some potential problems with judicial
personnel.
The state forum is the undiscussed and undeveloped alternative
to federal consolidation of mass torts. Its potential for achieving efficiency gains, while not disrupting important political and judicial
structures, make the state forum superior for mass tort consolidation.
I.

Federal Consolidation of Mass Torts

The movement for federal consolidation of complex cases began
with the promotion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Proponents urged liberalization of strict common law joinder rules so that
"one lawsuit [could] grow where two grew before."2 4 Complex lawsuits based on federal statutory claims soon appeared. 5 Expansive
24. ZECHARIA H. CHAFES, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry 149 (1950) ("In matters
of justice,. . . the benefactor is he who makes one lawsuit grow where two grew before.");
see Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing
purpose behind joinder provisions in federal rules).
25. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.1 (2d
ed. 1985) (discussing early complex cases under antitrust laws).
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readings of the constitutionally permissible federal jurisdiction under
both Article I 6 and the diversity 27 and federal question provisions
of Article III opened the door to new federal jurisdiction for consolidated tort cases that would otherwise have been handled by the state
courts. By the mid-to-late 1980s, a number of proposals for expanded
jurisdiction had surfaced.
A. Proposals for Federal Consolidation
The proposals for federal district court consolidation of mass tort
cases from state and federal courts have more similarities than differences. Those from the American Law Institute, the American Bar
Association, the House Judiciary Committee of the 101st Congress,
the Federal Courts Study Committee, and leading academic commentators all have as their centerpiece the transfer of mass tort cases from
dispersed state and federal courts to a single federal district court. 2 9
The American Law Institute (ALI) proposal employs a judicial
panel to consolidate complex cases, including both single incident
mass disaster litigation and widely dispersed product injury suits involving the same or similar products, into single federal forums.3 °
Federal jurisdiction would be expanded to accommodate these magnet cases. The expansion would extend supplemental jurisdiction to
cases that would otherwise be subject only to state court jurisdiction
but that arise from the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences as the federal action.3 1 A federal choice
of law rule would be imposed for the federal courts' use.3 2 Expanded
removal provisions would bring additional state cases to the federal
courts, subject only to highly limited conditions and exceptions.33
The ALI proposal builds on existing devices for consolidation of
cases in federal district courts, pretrial consolidation 34 and discretion26. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transp. Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
27. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
28. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
29. For more description and comparison of the leading proposals, see Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Jurisdictionaland TransferProposalsfor Complex Litigation,10 REv. LrriG. 325
(1991). Comments of proponents recognizing federalism and resource allocation objections are collected supra note 9.
30. ALI, supra note 2, §§ 5.01-.03.
31. Id. at § 5.03.

32. Id. at § 6.01(a).
33. Id. at § 5.01. Anti-suit injunctions would be available. Id. at § 5.04. Compulsory
intervention and preclusion would apply to nonparty claimants. Id. at § 5.05.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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ary change of venue.3" Unlike the current federal provisions, however, the ALI proposal would explicitly permit combined trials in
magnet district courts where the cases could not all have been brought
in the first place. 6 The resources and prestige of the ALI have made
its proposal 37 the most fully developed and documented.3
The American Bar Association (ABA) Mass Torts Commission
issued a report in 1989 supporting extensive consolidation of mass tort
cases in federal courts, both single-incident disaster litigation and
widely dispersed product suits.3 9 Consolidation would take place if
there were at least 250 cases from a single accident or product, and all
had claims in excess of $50,000.40 At the ABA's mid-year meeting in
1990, however, the proponents of the report withdrew a motion for its
approval. The membership went on to reject a resolution supporting
legislation to consolidate single-incident cases in the federal courts.4 1
The House Judiciary Committee of the 101st Congress also reported favorably on a plan to expand federal jurisdiction to cover single-incident mass accident cases.4 2 In contrast to the ABA proposal,
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
36. ALI, supra note 2, at § 3.06(c). As the ALI report indicates, federal courts have
consolidated cases for trial in 28 U.S.C. § 1407 transfers irrespective of that statute's applicability only to pretrial proceedings. Id. at 31.
37. As of this writing, however, the ALI has not published the final form of the proposal that is the subject of its reports. See ALI, supra note 2, at front cover (disclaimer of
responsibility for draft until adoption by membership).
38. The ALI proposal is unique in supplementing a proposal for transfer of state and
federal cases to a single federal forum with a proposal for transfer of some state and federal cases to a single state forum. The latter proposal, however, is much less complete and
appears to be less comprehensive than the federal consolidation proposal. It would employ a panel of assigning judges and a national choice of law standard. The existence of
both federal and state consolidation may give rise to a situation governed by Gresham's
law (the principle that people will use an easier or less risky approach despite any longterm negative consequences to the system as a whole) in which the cases generally will
gravitate toward the federal district courts. A similar phenomenon has been described
with regard to concurrent jurisdiction in federal claims and civil rights jurisdiction. See
infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. As will be seen, this Article strongly criticizes
the federal consolidation of state court cases that is at the heart of the ALI proposal.
39. ABA, supra note 3, at 18-25.
40. Id. at 27-28.
41. The Commission appeared to have miscalculated the politics of increased federal
jurisdiction for these cases, a topic discussed more fully infra at text accompanying notes
234-36. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REv. LrI. 401, 409-14 (1991) (discussing dynamics at ABA convention).
Ironically, though most of the members of the Commission were members of the defense
bar, they failed to anticipate a well-organized effort by defense counsel opposed to expansion of federal jurisdiction. See id. at 409.
42. MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICrION Acr OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 515, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990).
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its proposal did not cover widely dispersed injuries from the same or

similar products or other kinds of mass torts.43 The Committee's plan
would have transferred cases from various state and federal forums
into a single federal magnet proceeding, which would employ a federal choice of law standard.'W
The 1990 Report of the Federal Courts Study Commission also
endorsed the expansion of federal jurisdiction to cover mass torts and
the consolidation of tort cases filed in state and federal courts in the

federal district courts.45 The Commission's endorsement was somewhat ironic, given the Report's otherwise strong emphasis on diminishing federal caseloads and reserving federal judicial time for cases
that cannot be handled appropriately by state courts.46
Academic commentators have also contributed proposals.4 7

Most bear some similarity to the ALI, ABA, and Judiciary Committee
proposals.48 One that differs in several important particulars is that of
Professor Mullenix. Professor Mullenix would change the law to facil-

itate consolidation of dispersed products cases but would retain the
status quo for single-incident mass injury cases.49 Mullenix would also
permit individual plaintiffs to opt out of the combined action, subject
to what she describes as "extreme disincentives.""0 Mullenix also pro43. Id. at 6-7; see H.R. 3046 § 2(a).
44. H.R. 3046 §§ 2(a), 6(c).
45. FCSC, supra note 5, at 44-45.
46. See id. at 4-10. Although the Commission's other proposals have carefully reasoned rationales, only one conclusory paragraph supports the assertion that jurisdiction
should be expanded in mass tort cases. Id. at 44-45. The working papers released with the
report are even more brief (and somewhat more tentative) on this subject than the report
itself. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
CommIT ErWORKING PAPERS AND SuBcomnarrp REPORTS 457-58 (1990). They cite
limits on personal jurisdiction of state courts and state restrictions on service of process as
a rationale. Id. at 457. See infra text accompanying notes 240-65.
47. Literature on complex litigation has been termed "enormous." Linda S. Mullenix,
Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction,59 FORDHAM L. REv. 169, 169 n.1
(1990). An entire law review article has been devoted merely to cataloging the proposals.
See Rowe, supra note 29. Additional academic pieces proposing federal consolidation
schemes are listed supra note 6.
48. Professor Rowe and Mr. Sibley seem to have stimulated the most academic thinking on the topic. See generally Rowe & Sibley, supra note 6. Their proposals and the
others were foreshadowed by articles by Professors Kamp and McCoid. Kamp, supra note
6; McCoid, supra note 6. Still other academic commentators have proposed increased federal consolidation of mass tort cases through expansion of the federal class action rules.
E.g., Tobin, supra note 6; Note, Class Certification,supra note 6.
49. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1062-63 (relying on reports that most single-accident
cases litigated under existing jurisdictional rules have settled fairly easily).
50. Id. at 1067. The disincentive is having to pay the full amount of attorneys fees,
rather than a limited amount if one remains in the combined action. Id. at 1073. Imposing
costs that a person would have to pay anyway does not seem "extreme," although the
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poses a federal law of mass tort liability and damages, rather than a
federal standard for choosing state law.5 '
B. Erie Doctrine Problems of Federal Transfer and Consolidation
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins52 requires that federal courts apply
state law to issues covered by the general common law of torts and
contracts.53 The Erie doctrine reduces the role of the federal courts in
such cases to that of predicting what legal rules the applicable state
courts would apply to a given case, correspondingly reducing their
role in legal development from making law to forecasting it. This impoverishes the law that is applied.54 If the state law of mass tort is to
be developed by judicial decisions,55 strong majoritarian and federaldynamics of attorney-client decision-making may create difficulties holding the plaintiffs in
the group. Attorneys pursuing their own interests may advise clients to opt out. It is
doubtful that attorneys' professional responsibility will override the temptation of a larger
fee. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe PlaintiffsAttorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 678-84 (1986) (looking to attorneys' financial incentives to
predict litigation decisions) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.2(a)
(1983) (placing decisions concerning the objectives of representation on the client, rather
than the attorney). Using state attorney generals or otherwise excluding private counsel
from sharing in the fees from the mass proceeding will exacerbate the conflict of interest.
Cf. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1084-85 (proposing that state attorneys general prosecute
mass tort cases, and noting that lucrative fees are an incentive for attorneys to bring individual tort actions in mass disasters).
51. Mullenix, supra note 47, at 221-25.
52. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. Although the Erie doctrine applies most directly to diversity cases, its disestablishment of general federal common law affects any case whose rule of decision does not fall
within a federal statute or the few areas in which the Supreme Court has explicitly permitted common law development. DAVID W. LOuiSELL, ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
612 (6th ed. 1989). As noted above, most proposals for federal mass tort consolidation
contemplate the application of state law to the transferred cases, whether they began in
state or federal court. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
54. Judge Friendly catalogued the problems of federal application of state law in his
argument against diversity jurisdiction: "[I]n such cases federal courts cannot discharge the
important objective of making law. When the state law is plain, the federal judge is reduced to a 'ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state."' HENRY
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JuRISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 142 (1973) (quoting Richardson v.
Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562,567 (2d. Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.)). Friendly continued that cases
in which state law is unclear are worse, for the federal court cannot apply common sense
but must instead "exhaustively dissect each piece of evidence thought to cast light on what
the highest state court would ultimately decide." In some cases, "what passes as an attempt at prediction is a mere guess or fiat without any basis in state precedents at all. All
such cases are pregnant with the possibility of injustice." Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted).
55. Judge Posner notes that "reported court of appeals diversity cases tend to be ones
in which the state law is unclear, so that the decision must be rested on general principles
of common law rather than on slavish adherence to established state precedents. Such
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ism reasons exist to prefer state court development.56 The alternative
of a federal law of mass tort is even worse than that of federal courts
attempting to develop or interpret state law. Nationalizing mass tort
law would violate important federalism principles. Moreover, if developed by the federal judiciary, the law would be the invention of the
institution least capable of the task.
1.

Majoritarianand FederalismDisadvantagesto Federal Court
Development of State Law

There are valid reasons to prefer state court development of state
tort law. Tort law should reflect the will of the people. Most state
judges are elected,5 7 and therefore directly responsible to the people.
Although some commentators have criticized the process of judicial
election, they cannot deny that facing the voters influences the choices
that judges make. Critics have decried the low visibility of judicial
elections and the difficulty of making an informed vote.58 But participation rates in judicial elections meet or exceed those in other state
and local elections.5 9 Moreover, any judge who values obscurity
knows that the easiest way to lose it is to decide a case contrary to the
views of significant numbers of voters.6 °
decisions are necessarily creative." RICHARD A. POSNER, TrM FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 144 (1985).
56. Professor Resnick has noted that federal courts will take over the development of
mass tort law under the proposals for federal transfer and consolidation. Resnick, supra
note 11, at 56 ("The current set of proposals on aggregation use the federal courts as the
central forum. Such centralization will increase federal court power and, in the context of
mass torts, will shift the task of developing tort law from state to federal courts.").
57. Forty-one states employ some form of popular election for choosing or retaining
judges. 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNMENrs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, tbl. 4.4, at 23335 (1992-93).
58. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts,State Courts, and the Constitution:A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. Rnv. 369, 372 (1988).
59. ComparePeter Kendall, Mayoral Races Get Fast Start,CHI.TRm., Nov. 30,1992, at
Dl with Joseph R. 'Iybor & James Warren, Comerford Weathering Vote Scare, CH. TRIB.,
Nov. 9, 1988, at Cl (finding nearly identical participation rates in election for mayor in
1991 and election for superior court in 1988). See also Herb Robinson, Nonvoters' Problem May Be Boredom, SEATrLE TMnES, Sept. 21, 1990, at A6 (reporting similar participation for judicial and state representative elections). In the 1992 Texas election, the
candidate who received the most votes of any Democrat was running for reelection as
justice of the Supreme Court. Ross Ramsey, Election '92; No Pattern Emerged in Judicial
Elections; Some Incumbents Ousted, Others Win, HOUSTON CHRoN., Nov. 5, 1992, at A31.
60. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on FederalJurisdictionand ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329, 335
n.21 (1988) ("The point is that voters will remain apathetic only as long as state judges do
not make decisions which substantially anger or upset a majority of the voters.").
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In fact, much of the criticism of state judicial elections has centered on how the process may influence civil liberties decisions by
judges afraid of popular reaction.61 But the very factors that make
elected judges doubtful arbiters in some civil liberties cases make
them particularly appropriate for determining the rules of social and
economic conduct applicable to tort law. Popular reaction to decisions inconsistent with popular sentiment should be encouraged in
these fields. The judicial function of determining law is not simple
town-meeting majoritarianism.6 2 The judges must make priorities,
work compromises, and ensure stability of policy. 63 While judges act
as individuals, the ultimate authority of the voters indirectly shapes
their decisions.
Some commentators have argued that elected state judges are too
attuned to popular pressure to decide tort cases fairly.64 This attitude
is a fear of too much democracy. The elected state judiciary's development of tort law is an- example of popular self-governance that
should be permitted to flower.65 The whole point of the Erie doctrine
is that while federal courts may be trusted with resolving disputes involving diverse state citizens, they are not to make the law that governs private relations in a given state. In Professor Cover's words,
what "constitutes the Erie problem" is that "competence with respect
to dispute resolution" does not necessarily carry with it "concurrency
of competence in norm articulation. 6 6
In addition to better reflecting the will of the people, state judges
are better suited to adapt law to local concerns and needs. Judges
chosen by states owe their allegiance to the state and district by which
they are chosen. Even appointed judges who are chosen by district
will be representatives of the counties they serve; judges elected from
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Salomon & Suzanne D. Rubens, Make Judicial Selection
Make Sense, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1992, at C21.
62. See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
1571, 1576-77 (1988) (discussing accountability and independence of elected judges).
63. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-42 (1991) (discussing potential instability and inconsistency of
majoritarian institutions).
64. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCr LIABILITY MEss: How BusINEss CAN BE REsCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 26 (1988); see Weinstein, infra note 105 at

1918.
65. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 63, at 71 n.26 ("State courts have in fact been
more activist on economic matters than the federal courts. Since state judges are often
elected, and since state constitutions are more easily amended than the federal Constitution, this activism may be less objectionable [than activism by federal courts].").
66. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 645 (1981).
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a locality will be that much more sensitive to local concerns. Significantly, most states elect judges by local district; courts of appeals are
usually elected by region.6' Even state supreme court justices are frequently elected by district or 68
region to balance the conflicting interests
of various parts of the state.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Thompson 69 illuminates the

peril of having the federal courts become the primary expositors of
state tort law. In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court held that no fed-

eral question jurisdiction exists for a state tort claim which has as an
element the defendant's violation of the Federal Food and Drug
Act.70 The Court's decision to place a narrow construction on the jurisdiction statute 7 ' manifests concern about having federal courts apply state tort law, even when that law incorporates federal statutory

standards. The power to apply is the power to interpret, and
power to interpret is the power to displace. Although Congress
serted strong regulatory authority over medicines by enacting
Food and Drug Act regime, the Court concluded that Congress

the
asthe
re-

served to the state courts the development of tort law based on that
federal authority.72 The Court noted that narrow constructions of the

federal question jurisdiction statute reflect deference to state decisionmaking.73 The reason for deference is that local courts can better respond to popular will and local needs.
67. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENrS, supra note 57, tbl. 4.3, at 231.
68. See id. tbl. 4.1, at 227-28.
69. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
70. Id. at 817.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court conceded that a federal issue in a state-created cause
of action has, in other cases, led to federal question jurisdiction. Still, it noted that the
factors-including the traditional governance of state law in the field-that would support
the conclusion that there was no federal cause of action supported the conclusion that
there was no federal question jurisdiction. MerrellDow, 478 U.S. at 811-12. The Court did
not perceive any federal interest, even that in uniformity of interpretation of the federal
statute, that was strong enough to justify jurisdiction in the absence of a congressionallycreated cause of action. Id. at 813-17.
72. See id. at 811 ("In short, Congress did not intend a private federal remedy for
violations of the statute that it enacted.") (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 810-11, 815 n.12; see Patti Alleva, PrerogativeLost: The Trouble with Statutory FederalQuestion DoctrineAfter Merrell Dow, 52 OHIo ST. L.. 1477, 1531 n. 193 ("Indeed, with its emphasis on cause of action, Merrell Dow's remedy requirement is
presumptively pro-state forum."). As Professor Alleva states, id. at 1515, with regard to
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), a case whose restrictive reading of
28 U.S.C. § 1331's predecessor foreshadowed Merrell Dow, "In effect, the Court acknowledged the Kentucky legislature's ability to embrace federal standards as its own without
simultaneously forfeiting control over hearing the claims that it created." Moore held that
a state tort cause of action's incorporation of Federal Safety Appliance Act standards did
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Federal district and appeals judges are ordinarily drawn from the
states and regions in which they sit, and so might be thought to have
some sensitivity to local concerns. The life tenure and salary protection that come with the job inevitably distance them from the concerns of their communities, however. Political insulation is the whole
reason for those protections. 74 Moreover, once appointed, federal
judges tend to respond to national norms and to their own elite tradition. 75 This characteristic, which is so valuable when they are deciding
minority rights and civil liberties issues 7 6 pulls them away from the
localism that ought to shape state tort law.77
The differences in law that local majorities demand of state
judges are significant, and merit respect 7 8 For example, standards for

and limits on punitive damages reflect local views of corrective justice
that vary widely from state to state.79 Even such seemingly routine
not bring cases asserting the cause of action within federal question jurisdiction. Moore,
291 U.S. at 210.
74. Redish, supra note 60, at 336.
75. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1124 (1977).
76. See id. at 1124-26.
77. Moreover, federal magnet courts handling cases consolidated from the courts of
several states will lack the localized character that currently keeps federal judges sitting in
diversity somewhat in touch with the law of the states in which they sit. See Allan R. Stein,
Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L., 1935, 1972 (1991) (noting that "the state-bound
structure of the district courts [including locally drawn judges and jurors] is ... an accommodation to the principle of federalism."). And the added distance will add special difficulties to applying more peculiar areas of state law, even choice-of-law. Judge Friendly
made this point in a diversity case: "Our principal task... is to determine what the New
York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither
has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365
U.S. 293 (1961).
78. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1075 ("[F]or mass-tort litigation.... liability standards
vary markedly from state to state."); Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, State Choice of
Law in Mass Tort Cases:A Response to "A View from the Legislature",73 MARQ. L. REv.
625, 629 (1990) ("The differences [in tort law] from one state to another are not mere
matters of detail, but affect basic issues of duty, standard of care, causation, affirmative
defenses, and recoverable damages.").
79. CompareHodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988)
(awarding punitive damages in product liability action), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989),
with Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1979) (holding that punitive
damages are not available in product liability actions), aff'd, 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981).
Although only one jurisdiction bars both exemplary and punitive damages in all civil actions, see Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960), four states allow them only
when authorized by statute, see McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385-86
(La. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943); Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (Wash. 1977);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1992). Other states vary on issues such as the measure of
exemplary or punitive damages, whether the damages are available for punishment, deterrence, or both, and whether some categories of defendants are exempt from the awards.

Winter 19941

COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE STATE COURTS

229

issues as the elements and defenses for product liability causes of action differ."' The differences reflect the views of the citizens of the
states about which costs of accidents should be borne by whom, and
under what circumstances."1 Speaking about the division of authority
between state and federal courts, the Chief Justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court commented:
If state courts are able to deal with legal problems as well as or
almost as well as the federal courts, jurisdiction should be assigned to the state courts not only because this is consistent with
our national history, but also because it is a policy which conforms with the rule that governmental authority, whenever possible, should be exercised by that level of government most
directly connected with the citizenry affected by its
performance. 82
Moreover, as noted by American government students from Justice
Brandeis to modern political scientists, states serve as laboratories to
83
test public policies for other states and the national government.
Tort law is a field in which the experimentation has been particularly
fruitful.8
Lying beyond the general interest of majoritarian decision-making and the particular state interests in the law best adapted to local
conditions is an important constitutional interest: that of having comSee JAMES D. GHtruIn & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PuNrrrvE D~rAAo.s: LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 4.02 to 4.16 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (collecting cases and statutes).
80. See ABA, supra note 3, at 33 (listing different state approaches to market share
and risk contribution liability in product defect cases). Compare 2 AmUicAN LAW OF
PRODUcTs LIABLrrY § 16:9 (3d ed. 1987) (listing states that have adopted Restatement 2d
of Torts § 402A) id. § 16:13-:17 (listing states adopting other strict liability approaches) and
with id. § 16:18 (listing states rejecting strict product liability).
81. See Robert H. Cole, Windfall and Probability:A Study of "Cause" in Negligence
Law, (pt.1), 52 CAL. L. R v. 459, 473 (1964) (discussing negligence law); see also Judith
Jarvis Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 GEo. L.. 137, 138 (1987) (noting role of popular
sentiment in tort law).
82. Robert J. Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. &
MARY L. Rav. 789, 796 (1981). But see id. at 797 (stating that federal courts have superior
capacity "to adjudicate certain kinds of complicated litigation .... ).
83. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERzCAN SYSTEM:
UNITED STATES 388-89 (1966).

A
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84. Examples include the elimination of the privity requirement in products actions,
undertaken by the New York Court of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), and restriction of charitable immunity in the Illinois case Darling v.
Charleston Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
After a period of percolation, these innovations were widely adopted by other state courts
and legislatures.
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petently functioning states.85 The federal courts pursue that interest
by leaving the states free to solve problems with which they are competent to deal.86 State courts are quite able to deal with tort law. It is
their day-to-day work and, except perhaps for family law or collection
matters, the field in which the ordinary voting citizen is most likely to
be party to a civil lawsuit. No pattern of state court prejudice or case
mismanagement fuels the drive for federal jurisdiction over mass tort
cases.

2. InterpretationDifficulties Under Erie Doctrine
A state law of mass torts developed by federal courts under Erie's
peculiar rules would be a feeble and maladapted judicial creature.
One system of courts cannot simply borrow another's law in an area
as dynamic as that governing mass disasters and widespread product
injuries. In general, courts at the higher levels do not apply a static
body of law but create and recreate law to adapt to new problems and
conditions.87 But Erie assumes a world of static law, or at least one in
which a federal court can reliably predict what a state's highest court
would do on a given legal issue.
On issues like those involved in mass torts, even a prophet would
fail to capture the creativity that state courts display. For example,
would a federal court applying California law have come up with the
88 In that case, marketdecision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories?
share liability was imposed on the defendant drug manufacturers even
though the plaintiff did not know which manufacturer produced the
particular medicine her mother ingested. 89 In a previous federal diversity case, the court had limited enterprise liability to cases in which
a small group of defendants had both a joint awareness of risks and a
joint capacity to reduce them,90 factors that the Sindell court did not
85. Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HAnv. L. Ruv. 1485, 1488-89 (1987).
86. See id. at 1489 ("Federal jurisdiction is needed to correct stagnant situations in
which the states are not providing a forum or remedy for would-be federal plaintiffs. In
contrast, federal jurisdiction may be counterproductive when states are actively and constructively engaged in dealing with those problems.").
87. See Bu-NJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF T=E JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921)
("I have grown to see that the [judicial] process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but
creation . ..

").

88. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
89. Id. An equally unpredictable result would be Sindell's progenitor, Summers v.
Trice, 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948), in which the burden of proof was shifted to two persons
negligently firing rifles, one of whom injured the plaintiff.
90. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The
court was applying a form of national consensus tort law that relied significantly on Cali-
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require. 91 Another case that illustrates the prediction problem in a
dramatic fashion is Hudgens v. Cook Industries.9 2 The Oklahoma

Supreme Court departed from previous state law by deciding to hold a
shipper liable for the tort of its carrier, an independent contractor, if
the carrier was selected without due care.93 A federal court in a companion case from the same accident found no liability because it predicted the state would retain current law.94 Another development in
state law that a federal court could not have anticipated was the abolition of charitable immunity for public hospitals by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina.95 Just four years before that decision, a federal
court sitting in diversity applied the immunity in a published opinion. 96 Yet another example is Alvis v. Ribar,97 in which the Illinois
Supreme Court, by stroke of a pen, abolished contributory negligence
in favor of comparative negligence. 9 Federal courts sitting in diversity, like the state trial courts, had applied contributory negligence up
to the very day of the decision, confident that nothing would change
because of previous legislative rejections of the reform. 99

Not every unanticipated state court decision is an expansion of
liability."° The district court in Colorado predicted that the Colorado
Supreme Court would recognize parental consortium claims, in line
with the trend in other jurisdictions, only to have the state court reject
that extension of the law a year later. 1 1
fornia precedent. Ultimately, the court found an absence ofjoint activity among the manufacturers in New York, and severed the various cases before it for litigation in other
districts. Chance v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
91. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
92. 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1943).
93. Id. at 816.
94. Pierce v. Cook & Co., 437 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1970). Eventually, the federal court
allowed the losing plaintiff to return to court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Pierce v. Cook &
Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975).
95. Rabon v. Rowan Mem. Hosp., 152 S.E. 2d 485 (N.C. 1967).
96. Berry v. Odom, 222 F. Supp. 467 (M.D.N.C. 1963).
97. 421 N.E.2d 886 (MI1.
1981).
98. Id. at 898.
99. See id. at 895 ("Defendants point out that, since 1976, six bills were introduced in
the Illinois legislature to abolish the doctrine of contributory negligence .... ).
100. See Lawrence Baum & Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New
Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in STATE SuPREME COURTS: POLICYMAXERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 83, 100 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, eds., 1982) (discussing
"restraintist" state courts that have "refused to accept much of the doctrinal change in
support of tort plaintiffs that has occurred in the postwar period"), 101-02 (discussing unpredictable state courts that have picked and chosen among innovations).
101. Compare Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985)
(accepting parental consortium claim) with Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221
(Colo. 1986) (rejecting parental consortium claim). Another example is whether consor-
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Even the most prescient federal judge would have been unable to
predict what the state courts did in these cases. How then can that
judge predict what a state court would say about probabilistic causation, state-of-the-art defenses, and a host of other issues that have a
special bearing on mass tort cases? 10 2 As Judge J.Skelly Wright has
noted, in the era since Erie, state judges have made almost all the
significant contributions to the development of private law.' 3 It is not
that state judges are smarter or more observant than federal judges. It
is partly, but not merely, that they are closer to the electorate and thus
more sensitive to popular concerns. It is also that they have a freer
hand because they need not mimic what they think another jurisdiction would do.
Crabbed state law predictions by federal courts will frustrate important state policies that balance the interests of victims with those of
industry and commerce. The number of interested parties increases
the stakes. In mass torts cases, a few wrong decisions could affect
thousands of individual litigants.'0 4
tium awards in negligence actions are to be reduced for comparative negligence. The great
majority of states have rejected a federal court interpretation of New Hampshire law and
reduced the awards. Compare Macon v. Seaward Const. Co., 555 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977) (no
reduction), with Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1979) (reduction); Quadrone v.
Pasco Petroleum Co., 752 P.2d 504 (Ariz. 1987) (reduction); Nelson v. Busby, 437 S.W.2d
799 (Ark. 1969) (reduction); Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986)
(reduction); Haem v. City of Milton, 358 So. 2d 121 (Fla. App. 1978) (reduction); Mist v.
Westin Hotels, Inc., 738 P.2d 85 (Haw. 1987) (reduction); Runcom v. Shearer Lumber
Prods., 690 P.2d 324 (Idaho 1984) (reduction); Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equip. Co.,
572 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 1991) (reduction); McGuire v. Sifers, 681 P.2d 1025 (Kan. 1984) (reduction); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1969); Tichenor v. Santillo,
527 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. 1987) (reduction); Maidman v. Stagg, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App.
Div. 1981) (reduction); Scattaregia v. Shin Shen Wu, 495 A.2d 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(reduction); White v. Lunder, 225 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1975) (reduction); Weaver v. Mitchell,
715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986) (reduction). Federal courts attempting to apply state law in that
context might well have exposed the defendants to the full amount of the spouses' claims.
If the federal courts held a monopoly on the hearing of these cases, the rule might never
change to reflect the policy concerns of the courts that went the other direction.
102. Federal judges have a hard enough time even determining static state law without
having to predict what changes it will undergo. It is a small wonder that federal judges give
in to the temptation to dismiss suits on federal procedural grounds when the cases are
removed to federal court, even though the state courts would have rendered decisions on
the merits. See Stein, supra note 77, at 1972 (criticizing this practice).
103. J. Skelly Wright, In Praiseof State Courts: Confessions of a FederalJudge, 11 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 166 (1984); accord Baum & Canon, supra note 100, at 84 ("The
development of tort law in the United States is almost entirely the province of the state
appellate judiciary-usually state supreme courts. Although they were sometimes influenced by leading English decisions or by federal cases, most shifts in tort law originated
with the state high courts themselves.").
104. See Note, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 1140 (discussing federal bankruptcy trial of
state-law based tort claims: "[D]eterminations [of state tort law] always involve the possi-
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This Article does not propose abolition of existing federal diversity jurisdiction. Occasionally, judges exercising that jurisdiction have
made important contributions to the development of state common
law, 0 5 but they should not monopolize the application of state mass
tort law. Federal courts should not be permitted to displace the state
courts in one of their most important functions.
State courts will still retain the power to adjudicate single-incident tort cases under the federal consolidation proposals. Though the
law made in those cases may influence federal developments in mass
torts, the influence will not be significant. In fields other than mass
torts, the availability of mass proceedings has led to developments in
substantive law that would not have come about otherwise. 0 6 There
is no reason to suppose that mass torts will be an exception to this
process. Context is everything in the development of tort law, and the
contexts that are most likely to lead to tort law developments in the

present decade are those present in the cases the reformers would
send to federal court. 107

For example, in mass environmental disasters the common law of
property damage and personal injury may well converge over the next
decades to create a common law of environmental pollution torts. 0 8
bility of error .... When state law questions determine the rights of many thousands of
litigants, considerations of comity should cause a bankruptcy court to be doubly hesitant to
exercise jurisdiction."). Moreover, the federal system has only court of appeals review, if
the court of appeals is even interested, to force federal judges to make better guesses about
state law. The Supreme Court does not review for error in choice of a given state's law or
mistaken applications of the state's law. Even if additional review existed, it is doubtful
that the judges of the court of appeals or the Supreme Court would be any better than a
district judge at anticipating the tort policy of a given state. Indeed, the fact that the geographic and social distance of reviewing judges may make them worse at this job is probably part of the rationale for withholding review.
105. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Are
the Barriersto Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1918 (1989) (supporting
diversity jurisdiction with, among other arguments, the contention that "diversity serves an
important cross-fertilizing function.").
106. Hal S. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHI. L. Rv. 337,
337-71 (1971) (discussing the influence of class action procedure on the development of the
fraud on the market theory of liability in securities cases); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., &
Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHr. L. REv. 684,
692 (1941) (noting effectiveness of class suits for employee, investor, and taxpayer actions).
107. See Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretationof Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD.L. REv. 172, 197 (1992) (noting how recent developments in tort
law have moved away from focusing on individual cases and unique facts to standardization, aggregation, and apportionment; attributing some of the change to the greater use of
mass proceedings).
108. See AmnRcAN LAW INsTrrUTE, 2 ENTERPRISE LLABiLrrY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
353, 354-56 (1991) (contrasting property damage and personal injury threads of doctrine);
cf.Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-tort Cases: Causefor More Darknesson the Subject, Or a New
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That law would be impoverished if developed in single cases, for the
broad social problem presented is the broadcast nature of the injury. 10 9 As another example, in widespread product injuries recurring

issues of probabilistic causation may give rise to fractional recovery
for tortious conduct based on probability of future harm.110 In individual cases, fractional recovery is far less comprehensible to juries
and is thus less attractive than the conventional "more likely than not"
standard."1 From an economic standpoint, however, application of
the more-likely-than-not standard may create insufficient incentive to
adopt safety procedures because some actions that ought to be de-

terred cause a less-than-fifty percent probability of harm." 2 Similarly,
disputes over punitive damages have a wholly different character in
single-instance tort cases than they have in mass torts. States should
be permitted to adapt their law of punitive damages to the newly13
emerging field of mass torts.
Mass-tort law should not be completely divorced from the law of
single-incident torts. The same courts charged with development of
the law in individual torts should develop the law in mass torts, so that
the rules can be as harmonious and predictable as possible. Those
courts are the courts of the states.

Although state legislatures may overturn poor federal interpretations of state law with new state statutes, that option is unsatisfactory
as a means of wresting state tort law development from federal tribunals." 4 First, the state legislature may be unable to take action without undue delay because of the press of other business or irrelevant
political factors." 5 Second, legislative overruling is not a substitute
Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. RFv. 167, 169 (1985) ("As hazardous
substances increasingly infiltrate our environment and the number of multi-tort cases correspondingly rises, plaintiffs, defendants and the courts are confronted with many difficult
issues not presented in conventional single incident tort cases.").
109. AMEruCAN LAW INsTrruTE, supra note 108, at 358.
110. See Richard W. Wright, Causationin Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1813 (1985)
(discussing fractional recovery based on probabilities of future injury).
111. See id. at 1816-21 (discussing multiple-defendant situations).
112. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes:
A PrincipledDefense of Joint and Several Liabilityfor Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1141, 1200-01 (1988).
113. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying
state law to punitive damages issue in asbestos case), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
114. But see Kelly D. Hickman, Note, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1237, 1251 (1989) (asserting that state legislatures and highest courts can easily overrule erroneous interpretations of state law).
115. Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv. 995, 996,
998 (1985) (noting difficulties in legislatively overruling judicial decisions, including inertia,
bicameralism, committee politics, and parliamentary maneuvering); see Baum & Canon,
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for common law development. The problem is not so much that federal courts will make wrong decisions as that they will not make the

shifts in the law that represent common law development. This is better done on a case-by-case basis by skilled members of the judiciary
than it is by preoccupied, less expert members of the state legislature,
operating outside concrete factual settings.

Federal courts in consolidated proceedings may certify questions
of state law to state tribunals. That option, however, is also unsatisfactory. Few federal courts take advantage of the certification procedure-no mechanism exists to force them to do so116-and it has
several practical disadvantages. Certification takes too long.'1 7 Ques-

tions are extremely difficult to frame, and may change as the litigation
progresses. The quality of attention the question receives is probably
lower than if it were presented in an actual case before the state court.
In an actual case, the litigants appear, convenient access exists to the
full record, and the weight of responsibility for a decision on the merits falls on the deciding court; none of these factors applies to a certified question. Abstract interpretation of law, even by a court, does
not substitute for interpretation in a case with concrete facts before a
court that holds ultimate responsibility for the decision." 8

supra note 100, at 94 ("Obtaining legislative consideration of a tort law issue, however, is
often a vain hope.... [Courts have noted] that the legislature was simply too pressed with
other business to put tort reform issues on its agenda.").
116. A federal court that does certify need not follow the answer it receives. Gregory
Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 937,
954 n.53 (1988); see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70,72 (5th Cir. 1962) (certifying question); 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla.) (answering question); 325 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir.
1963) (ignoring answer), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174
So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1965) (stating that Green applied Florida law incorrectly); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Florida law expressed in
McLeod), overruled, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911
(1970).
117. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1076 n.196 (reporting delay of two years in Jackson v.
Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), in certification of
three questions to Mississippi Supreme Court); David L. Shapiro, FederalDiversityJurisdiction; A Survey and a Proposal,91 HARv. L. Rtv. 317, 326-27 (1977) (reporting long
delays).
118. The difficulty courts have with developing law in abstract settings is a significant
part of the rationale for the prohibition on advisory opinions and the imposition of elaborate justiciability requirements in the federal courts. A similar difficulty will inevitably
beset state courts serving an advisory capacity. Some state courts do, of course, render
advisory opinions, although frequently the courts are limited to passing on legislation.
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3. A FederalLaw of Mass Tort?
Professors Vairo" 9 and Mullenix 20 as well as some other commentators 121 have proposed the creation of a uniform federal law of
mass tort.122 Professor Vairo has noted that federal mass tort law
would ease the administration of a transfer and consolidation regime
by eliminating difficult choice of law determinations by the magnet
courts. 123 Professor Mullenix contends that a federal law of mass torts
would make consolidated federal cases easier to adjudicate, 24 and
that federal jurisdiction over mass tort cases without the application of
federal law raises serious difficulties under Article III of the Constitution."2 Because of the institutional awkwardness that federal judges
119. See generally Vairo, supra note 108.
120. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1077.
121. Professor Epstein has proposed the extension of federal law to some areas that
affect both mass and individual torts, particularly the question whether conformance to
federal standards for products conclusively establishes that the product is not defective.
Epstein, supra 6, at 31. Nevertheless, Epstein stresses the value of divergent state tort law
in other areas, and criticizes the ALI proposal for overstressing uniformity of result in
similar geographically dispersed cases. Id. at 20-23. Judge Rubin also favors national
product liability standards that would be part of a uniform product liability law. Alvin B.
Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters,20 GA. L. Rnv. 429, 443-45 (1986). Judge
Rubin's approach bears some similarity to that of Judge Weinstein, who has favorably commented on the idea of a federal toxic tort statute, while also noting the attractiveness of
administrative compensation schemes that presumably would apply uniform federal law.
Jack B. Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters,11 COLUM. J.
ENvTm. L. 1, 33-35,43-44 (1986). Professor Weinberg has voiced support for the legitimacy
of a broad federal common law that could embrace such matters as mass tort. Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rv. 805, 842 (1989). Taking these approaches one step further, Professor Corr has proposed abolishing the Erie doctrine altogether, a proposal that, as he notes, would at least simplify first year civil procedure
courses. John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 1087, 1088-89
(1992). Other judges and academic sources commenting favorably on a federal common
law, including some who favor a federal common law of mass tort, are listed by Professor
Mullenix in her 1986 article. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1077-78 n.201. Legislative proposals are catalogued id. at 1078-79 n. 203.
122. Among those who would consolidate mass torts in the federal courts, even the
opponents of federal law for the cases generally favor a federal choice of law standard.
See, e.g., ALI, supra note 2, at 395. Two prominent commentators oppose federal consolidation precisely because of the need to create such a standard. Sedler & TWerski, supra
note 78, at 626. Consolidation in state courts would permit those courts to apply their own
choice of law standards; if that were encouraged, this whole controversy would be avoided.
123. Vairo, supra note 108, at 203.
124. Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1077.
125. See generally Mullenix, supra note 47. The argument challenges conventional
views about jurisdiction under Article I of the Constitution, see National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600 (1949) (plurality opinion), and the "arising
under" federal law clause of Article III, § 2, see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983). Because this Article concludes that neither additional federal
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have in developing state law, a federal mass tort law may be the ultimate tendency of any federal consolidation mechanism. 26
Nationalizing mass tort law would be a serious mistake. Local
needs and concerns are reflected in local tort law. Different results
should occur in similar cases brought by plaintiffs in different states if
the results embody policy decisions of those states' courts and legislatures. 127 Allowing disparate state policy choices carries the advantages of increased experimentation, allowance for local variation, and
opportunity for enhanced public participation. All three of these advantages were noted above as the advantages of having state judges
rather than federal judges determine state mass tort law; they deserve
fuller explanation in response to the contention that there should be
no state mass tort law to determine.
Divergent state law allows different states to experiment' 28 with
standards for liability and forms of relief. For example, over the past
ten years, many states adopted limits on liability and damages under
the banner of tort reform. 29 Only now are meaningful studies aptort law nor additional federal jurisdiction is desirable, there is no occasion to address
Mullenix's contention.
126. Judge Schwarzer of the Judicial Council of the United States stated at legislative
hearings on H.R. 3406:
There are.., proposals for multi-forum, multi-party legislation that would create
Federal jurisdiction founded on the commerce clause and extending to mass torts
.... These proposals would vastly expand federal jurisdiction, federalize much of
tort law, and overburden the federal courts. Because these proposals call for a
wholesale shifting of litigation from State to Federal courts and displacement of
State law in areas traditionally within its purview, the Conference may be expected to oppose them.
Multiparty, Multiforum JurisdictionAct of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 3406 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1989) (statement of Hon. William W. Schwarzer)
[hereinafter, "Hearings"].
127. Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REv. Lrrxo. 273, 287 (1991).
128. The classic statement on state public policy experimentation is that of Justice Brandeis: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does FederalismPromote Innovation?,9 J. LEGAL SrTU. 593 (1980) (assuming
that state politicians seek only to be reelected, and applying public choice theory to conclude that state government choices are not likely to be innovative). Professor Rose-Ackerman's theoretical argument appears to conflict with the historical record, at least with
respect to innovation in tort law. See supra text accompanying notes 88-104 and infra text
accompanying notes 129-31.
129. See Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races". The 1980s Tort Crisis and
the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 220-22 (1990) (collecting statutes from 48
states).
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pearing on whether these experiments were beneficial. 130 Federal
preemption of tort law now would cause a national decision on
changes in the law when the experimental evidence on tort reform is
still out; a uniform law in the future would stifle further small-scale
experimentation in tort law. Any future experiments will take place
with 255 million human subjects. 3 '
Local variations also justify differing standards of conduct and
measures of compensation. Individuals vary in how risk-averse they
are, and the distribution of risk-averse individuals will vary from state
to state. Because greater liability leads rational businesses to make
more safety expenditures, and those expenditures are certain losses in
relation to wealth as a whole, a risk-prone society might opt for lower
standards of liability, which will entail lower safety costs, the chance of
greater overall wealth, and more risk of individual injury. 3 Similarly,
a wealthier or more risk-averse society might opt for more liability
and greater safety expenditures. Making the decision at the state level
will permit different solutions by different groups of people; it will
also permit movement within the United States by persons attracted
130. E.g., id. A recent report indicates that the Clinton administration is seriously studying the results of state medical malpractice reform experiments in considering whether to
build liability or damages limits into its health cost containment proposals:
Among the ideas under consideration, some of which have been tried at the
state level, are these:
" Limit damages for a patient's "pain and suffering."
" Reduce damages to take account of any money the patient gets from insurance or worker's compensation.
& Allow doctors to make payments periodically, over a number of years,
rather than in a lump sum.
- Encourage patients to settle claims through mediation rather than court
trials.
Supporters of such measures say they have produced benefits when tried in
some states, particularly California.
Robert Pear, Clinton May Seek Lid on DoctorFees and Liability Suits, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 8,
1993, at Al. Empirical studies of the experience of various states with no-fault automobile
accident laws drew unfavorable conclusions. See Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance,Liability,
and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1982), which may have prevented more widespread adoption of
the plans.
131. It is conceivable that Congress could authorize some small-scale experimentation
with changes in an otherwise uniform codification of tort law, but it has done little in that
dimension with other federal statutes that give rise to liability. A federal common law of
torts might create some unplanned circuit-level differences that would yield a little comparative information, but the process would be unreliable. Moreover, if the whole goal of
federal tort law is uniformity, one would expect the Congress or the Supreme Court to
quash variations that could lead to useful knowledge.
132. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOac ANALYsIS OF LAW 158 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing example of risk preferrers and safety precaution expenditures).
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to a given state's mix of safety and risk133among the other considerations that determine relocation choices.
Even the content of the tort law should differ from place to place,
for geographic variations will occur in the kinds of hazards that potential defendants should prevent and that potential plaintiffs should
avoid. An uncovered coal hole was a more common danger in nineteenth century Boston than it would have been in a place with a
warmer climate; its presence was not considered evidence of negligence there. 34 Mass torts may yield fewer examples of this type than
ordinary torts, but assessments about many of the conditions and conduct that may be considered negligent will still vary from place to
1 35

place.

Public participation is an additional value of state decision-making in tort law. Whatever influence an individual has over national
government, that individual has more over state government, and still
more over local government, from which many state judges are
drawn. 36 Divergences of opinion among the citizens who participate
in political decisions are the whole cause of different results in different places.' 37 For example, elected judges in different states have disagreed about the imposition of market-share liability in defectiveproduct cases. The legislatures of neighboring states have disagreed
on damages ceilings for personal injuries. 38 The importance of per133. Only the most accident-prone person would actually choose a state based on its
liability rules, but individuals may well choose location based on the general culture of a
place, of which risk preference or aversion is a part, or on economic climate, which liability
rules may affect.
134. See Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.) (finding that an
uncovered coal hole near a heap of coal and persons engaged in delivering the coal was not
any evidence of negligence, given common experience of persons in Boston).
135. The expectations of persons making and taking prescription drugs might be fairly
uniform throughout the United States, but the same statement would not apply to persons
maintaining and coming in contact with hazardous sites or environmental dangers confined
to a given locality.
136. Cf ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT 116 (1976) ("I should be... irked ... if the Supreme Court were to void an
ordinance adopted in the open Town Meeting in the... town in which I live-a meeting in
which all citizens can participate-but I should have little such feeling about a statute enacted by the Massachusetts legislature ...and none about a law made ...by the Congress
of the United States.").
137. See Charles M. iebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 418 (1956).
138. Compare IND.CODE Ar. § 16-9.5-2-2 (West 1993) ($500,000 limit on total recovery in medical malpractice cases; $750,000 limit for occurrences after Jan. 1, 1990; liability
limit of $100,000 per provider) with David Heckelman, Tort-reform bill likely to fail,Democrats Predict, C-n. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 8, 1993, at 1 ("Newly introduced tort-reform
legislation that would limit a plaintiff's recovery of non-economic damages to $250,000 has
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mitting divergent popular opinion to lead to divergent law is buttressed by the reality that common law rules reflect and influence the
morality of the areas they affect. State courts influence the development of morality in their local or regional communities through common law adjudication.139 As popular representatives, elected judges
are especially well qualified for this role. Furthermore, as noted
above with respect to functions that should be reserved to state courts,
allowing states to develop their own law strengthens them as governmental units.
Overriding the Erie doctrine in the field of mass torts would be a
giant step backwards for the federalism values that Erie embodies.
Erie's direction to the federal courts to apply state law in torts and
contracts guarantees the states control of the law in those areas. This
protection for the states is "the very essence of federalism. ' 140 States

merit the protection not only by their traditional control over tort law,
but also by the experimentation, local adaptation, and public participation values that state control of mass tort law preserves. Even the

Federal Tort Claims Act generally requires courts to apply the law of
the state where the tort occurred,"' shunning the development of a

no greater chance of passing than did a similar measure that failed last year, a spokesman
for House Speaker Michael Madigan said Monday.").
139. See Maltz, supra note 115, at 1022.
140. John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny As Choice of Law Cases, 11 HoUsTON L.
Rnv. 791, 794 (1974) ("The Erie cases embody the very essence of federalism in that the
choice between federal law and state law will be made by a determination as to whose
interest is paramount on a particular issue."). This view is most strongly associated with
Justice Harlan, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J.concurring), but
other commentators are in accord, e.g., Richard Freer, Erie's Midlife Crisis, 63 TuLANE L.
Rnv. 1087, 1096 (1989); Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 116, at 942-52; Martin H. Redish &
Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of DecisionAct: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REv. 356, 360 (1977); see also Henry J.Friendly, In Praiseof ErieAnd of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 383, 394-98 (1964) (describing
and defending constitutional basis of Erie as limits on congressional and federal judicial
control of state issues). Professor Ely disputes this view, relying on the constitutional
power of Congress to pass legislation that governs state tort cases and other disputes, but
that position ignores both the prudential rule that Congress should preserve federalism by
generally refraining from nationalizing new areas of law and the institutional factors that
keep Congress, but not the federal courts, from doing so. Compare John Hart Ely, The
IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. Rnv. 693, 704-06 (1974) (discussing constitutional
basis of Erie) with Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87
HARv. L. Rnv. 1682, 1683-85 (1974) (emphasizing representation of states' interests in
Congress, but not in the federal courts).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). Some exceptions apply. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680
(1988).
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federal common law in a field where national interest is apparent, 14 2
but state variation matters more. 143
Professor Vairo, whose proposals for a federal common law of
mass tort are the most fully developed, argues that the federalism
value of Erie would be satisfied by an implicit congressional assertion
of power over the field of mass torts through passage of legislation
that partially governs activities such as product safety and design."
The argument fails, however, because the protection of federalism in

national lawmaking depends on formal congressional structures that
give states indirect power. The states' power comes from their control

of the formation and passage of individual statutes: scrutiny of legislative text by state politicians; participation in the committee hearing

process; and the actions of individual, locally-interested representatives and senators on the floor and behind the scenes. 145 These struc-

tures do not protect the states from "implicit" legislative delegations
of power to the federal courts. The courts that would be formulating a
142. Professor Vairo argues that federal interests justifying the creation of a federal law
of mass tort are enhanced when the existing consolidation device of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is
applied. Vairo, supra note 108, at 207-08.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
144. Vairo, supra note 108, at 176-77 n.50. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972), is inapposite. A dispute between the government of one state and a political subdivision of another over pollution is primarily a dispute over interstate relations, not pollution. Choosing a single state's law to govern interstate relations problems makes little
sense; Congress and the Supreme Court have long shared responsibility for regulation of
quarrels between states. The United States Constitution is the ultimate source of the duties at issue, and, as illustrated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Constitution provides its own implied cause of action
for some of the duties it imposes. LoUISELL, supra note 53, at 526 ("Federal claims premised on the Constitution include claims based on the provisions that subordinate the
states to the Federal Government, see, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee .... ."); cf. U.S.
CoNsr. art I, § 2 (assigning original jurisdiction in disputes between states to Supreme
Court). On the same day Erie came down, Justice Brandeis himself applied federal common law to a riparian dispute that hinged on the validity and interpretation of a congressionally-authorized interstate compact. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Disputes like those in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee and
Hinderliderare considered intrinsically federal, as are some controversies involving foreign
relations. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964) (applying
federal common law in dispute with foreign government involving act of state doctrine).
By contrast, mass tort cases, even those involving interstate activities such as pollution, are product liability or accident problems, -on which state experimentation and response to local needs should be welcomed. Congress has the power to end the
experimentation and local accommodation by specific lawmaking, but Congress has wisely
refrained from doing so. In the absence of specific federal statutes, tort law should be
governed by the state common law selected according to reasonable choice of law principles. See supra text accompanying notes 127-60.
145. See GRODZINs, supra note 83, at 376-78.
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federal law of mass tort are remarkably insulated from any political
influence by the states. 4 6

Professor Vairo also argues that the constitutional premise of
Erie, that is, the absence of federal authority to regulate the fields of
human behavior governed by state common law, does not apply to
mass torts. 147 Congress has passed many laws governing the manufac-

ture and distribution of products, the transportation of passengers,
and the like."4 But the Constitution assigns this power to Congress,
and not to the United States government in general. 49 Apart from
the interpretation of specific statutes, the federal courts do not have a
constitutional role in the regulation of interstate commerce. 50 Even
interpretation of federal statutes is not a monopoly of the federal
courts. 151 Congress has barred general federal jurisdiction of cases in146. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. Professor Redish contends that the discovery of implicit, unlimited delegations of lawmaking to the federal judiciary violates the
Rules of Decision Act. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 761, 788-90,
792-99 (1989).
147. Vairo, supra note 108, at 175.
148. See id. at 175-76 n. 44-45 (collecting statutes).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Indeed, even at the time of Erie, Congress had enacted extensive railroad regulation; the Supreme Court could hardly have contended that
Congress lacked the power to regulate liability in train-pedestrian accidents like the one
that gave rise to the Erie case itself. See Friendly, supra note 140, at 397 n.66.
150. See JACK H. FRIEDENrHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 197 (1985). Professor Vairo
disagrees, stating that Congress has implicitly authorized creation of a federal common law
by passing statutes. The Supreme Court interpretation of congressional intent in Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, however, is that Congress did nothing of the sort
in the Food and Drug Act. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804, at 815-17. The revolutionary
change of creating a federal common law of mass tort should hardly be ascribed to Congress without clear evidence. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that Congress does
not want to federalize tort law. See infra note 151 (describing Congress's recent rejection
of proposed federal product liability damages standards).
151. Although these separation-of-powers reasons would probably make a statutory
federal law of tort superior to a federal common law, statutory nationalization would also
frustrate the goals of state experimentation and adaptation to local conditions. The Senate
recently rejected a bill that would have imposed federal standards for damages in product
liability suits, creating incentives for lower settlements and restructuring the contingent-fee
system. See Senate Kills Legislation To Curb Liability Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at
C4. The rejection in 1992 reduces the likelihood of favorable action in the House on any
similar measure during the next session. Peter Passell, Economic Scene: Safer Mousetraps
Or Better Ones?, N.Y. Timrs, Sept. 10, 1992, at C2. The local orientation of members of
Congress, which keeps the Supreme Court from having to take an aggressive posture to
preserve states' rights under the Tenth Amendment, may be operating here, just as the
Supreme Court has hypothesized. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985) (stating that means of selection of members of Congress and various congressional structures act to uphold state and local interests); Redish, supra note
146, at 767 (discussing the Rules of Decision Act: "The legislature, traditionally more responsive to state concerns than the federal judiciary, has chosen to protect federalism in-
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volving federal statutes unless the statute furnishes a cause of action
or some other independent basis supplies federal jurisdiction.'5 2 MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Thompson explains the reasons to be
reluctant even to edge towards a federal common law of products liability. Several references in the text and an extensive footnote commented on the absence of significant federal interests in the case and
the corresponding importance of the state interest. 5 3
It is possible to argue that states have an incentive to make the
law less favorable to defendants than to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs tend to
sue at home or be drawn to states whose law is favorable to them.
Consequently, plaintiffs will, in comparison with defendants, be disproportionately citizens of the state who will have political influence
on the state's policies. Manufacturers and other defendants with operations in other states will be the recipients of the externalized costs
of the injured citizens of the forum state.'5 4 The premises of this argument are doubtful, however. Current rules of state territorial jurisdiction, which make the defendant's home state the one place in which
jurisdiction is indisputable,' 5 will draw plaintiffs to the defendant's
home forum. If a state-court consolidation mechanism is in place, this
tendency will be enhanced, because the magnet forum most likely to
have jurisdiction will be that in which the defendant is located. Moreover, potential defendants and potential plaintiffs are concentrated in
the same, most populous states, so plaintiffs are likely to be suing coterests by legislatively limiting federal judicial power to supplant state law."). Other
difficulties with a federal common law include one ascribed to diverse state common law:
principles will vary from circuit to circuit, even from court to court. Jackson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1326 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting application of federal
common law); Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1079. Moreover, pressure would mount on the
Supreme Court to surrender more and more of its docket to resolving the conflicts, to the
exclusion of other cases with more importance to national concerns.
152. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808-09; Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the
District Courts, 53 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 157, 160-63 (1953).
153. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-11, 814-15 & n.12. The Court remarked favorably on
a test for jurisdiction that looks to the nature of the federal interest at stake, and noted that
even the violation of a federal standard as the element of a tort claim "did not fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action." Id. at 814-15 n.12. Professor Alleva has
correctly characterized the approach of the Merrell Dow Court as "mechanistic" in its reliance on the absence of a federal cause of action to determine the absence of federal question jurisdiction, but the mechanistic reasoning has its function in holding the line on
federalization of tort law. See generally Alleva, supra note 73, at 1484.
154. Mr. Hay has raised a somewhat similar argument with regard to state choice of law
rules and offered a refutation on different grounds. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and
State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 Geo. L.J. 617 (1992). See generally
PosNER, supra note 55, at 175-77 (raising similar argument with respect to diversity jurisdiction and answering it).
155. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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citizens. Insurance companies, who actually pay, are similarly concentrated in the larger states and may well be co-citizens with the
plaintiffs.
Additional considerations will keep the courts from making the
law too unfavorable, even to out-of-state defendants. Even if the actual defendants in a given case have their operations out of state, the
rules of law imposed by the court will have to be applied uniformly to
in-state defendants as well. Furthermore, out-of-state defendants, like
defendants generally, have some "repeat-player" advantages in influencing courts; 5 6 they and their insurers have the ability to influence
state legislatures as well.5 7 Perhaps because of the weakness of the
argument's premises, empirical evidence does not support the conclusion that state law is unfavorable to defendants. State law cannot accurately be described as more adverse to defendants than comparable
federal tort law found in such areas as admiralty or federal employers'
liability. In fact, over recent years there has been a decrease in product liability recoveries, which might be traced to the influence of defendants and insurance companies on state judges and juries.' 58 Tort
reform, a major priority of insurers and the corporations they cover,
has also succeeded at the state rather than the national level.'5 9
An argument might also be made that varied tort law standards
make standardized manufacture and marketing difficult. That position is inconsistent with the American national experience, in which
state tort law has varied widely from place to place at the same time
that national manufacturing and distribution have become pervasive.
The tendency of the state law regime will be to induce national makers and distributors to conform to the most difficult standard. Lowrisk-of-liability pockets will exist throughout the country but there is
no reason to think this condition is bad.
Congress does have ties to state and local government 60 that federal judges, once appointed, do not need to maintain. For that reason,
a law of mass torts created by Congress may be more sensitive to local
needs than one devised by the judiciary using common law powers.
But the very uniformity that is the reason for federal mass tort law
156. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y Rv. 95 (1974).
157. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 129, at 218 (describing role of insurance companies and industry groups in lobbying for state tort reform packages).
158. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. Rnv. 731, 791 (1992).
159. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 129, at 214-18.
160. See Mishkin, supra note 140, at 1685; Mishkin, supra note 152, at 160-63.

Wmter 1994] COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE STATE COURTS

245

would frustrate the federalism objectives of experimentation, adaptation to local needs, and participation, no matter where in the national
government the law originated.
C. Resource Allocation Problems of Federal Transfer and
Consolidation

Even the strongest proponents'of transfer and consolidation of
mass tort cases to the federal courts recognize that their proposals
would exacerbate case congestion in the district courts and courts of
appeals.161 The congestion problem is already severe. From 1958 to
1988, the number of cases filed in the district courts tripled; the
number filed in the courts of appeals increased more than ten times.' 62
Federal judges were hardly underworked in the 1950s.163 Although
the number of federal judges has more than doubled since that time,
and the judges receive more extensive staff support than previously,
both the backlog of cases and the length of time to termination have
increased markedly in recent years.'6 The proposals to consolidate
complex litigation in the district courts will flood those courts' dockets
with complicated cases, which by their nature require intensive judicial intervention at all stages. 6 5 The judges will respond in the only

manner they can: 166
delaying other judicial business until enough of it
simply goes away.

Adding more judges presents its own problems. 16 7 Proliferation
of judges would diminish judicial prestige, discouraging good candidates from taking the job. Unavoidably, it would force those selecting
judges to dip lower into the pool of interested candidates. 68 These
161. See sources cited supra note 6. Some critics of federal consolidation base their
opposition, in part, on the expected congestion the cases will cause. See, e.g. Hearings,
supra note 126, at 17 (statement of Judge Schwarzer).
162. FCSC, supra note 5, at 5.
163. POSNER, supra note 55, at 77.
164. FCSC, supra note 5, at 5-6.
165. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 25, at 5-6.
166. Judge Posner has written, "A judicial system's short-run response to higher demand is delay. Delay not only postpones but reduces demand; it diminishes the expected
benefit of litigating to the plaintiff by reducing the present value of any judgment he receives ... , and thus makes substitutes such as settlement and... arbitration more attractive." POSNER, supra note 55, at 11.
167. Id. Some would argue that because courts do not charge users anything but a
nominal cost for adjudicating their cases, increasing the system's capacity will simply enable still more people to bring their disputes to the newly-improved federal judicial system.
Judge Posner states: "It is like building an expensive highway to relieve congestion but
charging users nothing: there is no incentive for the users to seek substitutes that may be
cheaper for society as a whole, so congestion soon reasserts itself." Id.
168. Id. at 40, 99; accord FRIENDLY, supra note 54, at 28-30.
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losses would reduce the quality of justice in the federal statutory and

constitutional cases the federal judiciary must decide.169
Congestion, delay, and mediocrity are the sad facts of modem
life. Every judicial system tolerates them to some degree. Should
their increase be tolerated to achieve the perceived advantages of consolidation of mass tort cases in federal courts? Considerations of comparative advantage between state and federal forums counsel "no."
Federal judges' most appropriate role is the interpretation of federal constitutional and statutory law,'7 0 especially in politically sensitive cases.' 71 These are the cases in which their political insulation
169. See POSNER, supra note 55, at 40, 99. The Federal Courts Study Committee summarized this point:
The independence secured to federal judges by Article III is compatible with responsible and efficient performance of judicial duties only if federal judges are
carefully selected from a pool of competent and eager applicants and only if they
are sufficiently few in number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of
their actions. Neither condition can be satisfied if there are thousands of federal
judges. The process of presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation
would become pro forma because of the numerosity of the appointees; a sufficient number of highly qualified applicants could not be found unless salaries of
federal judges were greatly increased; and a judge who felt like simply a tiny cog
in a vast wheel that would turn at the same speed whatever the judge did would
not approach the judicial task with the requisite sense that power must be exercised responsibly-especially when the judge, by reason of having life tenure,
lacked the usual incentives to perform assigned tasks energetically and
responsibly.
FCSC, supra note 5, at 7. Both Judges Posner and Friendly have commented on the difficulty and possible futility of significant increases in court of appeals judges. FRIENDLY,
supra note 54, at 28-30, 45-46 (noting probable decrease in candidate quality, rise in panel
conflicts and need for en banc proceedings, and diminution in collegiality); POSNER, supra
note 55, at 99-100.
Professor Chemerinsky, writing on the subject of federal-state court parity, contends
that even a doubling of the federal judiciary would not create trouble attracting the most
desirable candidates. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered. Defining a Role for the
FederalJudiciary, 36 UCLA L. REv. 233, 324; accord Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges,
Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 ("We have 160 court of appeals judges ....
They are, undoubtedly, all fine individuals. However, I can assure you that there are far
more than 160 other persons in the legal community who are just as fine, just as qualified
and just as talented as we are."). Still, Chemerinsky does not deny that prestige does lure
promising candidates to the job, and that prestige is inversely related to the number of
persons holding the position. Chemerinsky, supra at 324. Although he holds out hope for
salary increases to compensate for the prestige decrease, he recognizes the possibility of
political obstacles to raises for the judiciary. Id. As Chemerinsky notes, the question is
really an empirical one. Id. The difficulty is that the population of the United States is the
human subject of any experiment on the topic.
'170. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DvisION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-68 (1969); DAVID CURRY, FEDERAL COURTS
139 (4th ed. 1990); MARTIN H. REDiSH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 96 (2d ed. 1990); Alleva, supra note 73, at 1495.
171. Neuborne, supra note 75, at 1115-17.
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and elite tradition make them far better adjudicators than many state
judges will be. Professor Neuborne has identified the factors that
make federal judges particularly good at enforcing constitutional
rights of unpopular individuals and groups. 72 These include technical
competence on constitutional issues, widespread attitudes in support
of individual rights claims, and political insulation. 173 Even a commentator who opposes the notion of an "elite" federal judiciary agrees
that federal judges' political independence makes them better at adjudicating federal constitutional claims than state courts are. 174
The advantages enjoyed by federal courts in interpreting the Federal Constitution and laws evaporate when the federal judges turn
their attention to tort cases controlled by the common law of the
states. Although the smaller number of federal judges and some aspects of federal selection and staffing may lead to generally high levels
of technical proficiency, 75 the technical proficiency is likely to be concentrated in areas such as federal statutes, procedure, and constitutional law. Moreover, some aspects of technical proficiency are of
greater importance in civil rights cases, where the claims challenge
conventional approaches to the law. 76 On the other hand, the "ivory
tower syndrome" described by Professor Neuborne, which leads federal judges to disregard "distasteful and troubling fact patterns" and
uphold constitutional claims, 7 7 cannot be expected to be beneficial
when working in the fact-driven world of tort law. Sensitivity to the
facts of the case and the real-world effects of legal rules ought to be
the driving forces in the development and application of the law of
torts.

178

172. Id. Professor Chemerinsky has noted that the general question of federal-state
court parity (or the superiority of one or the other) is an empirical one, though Professor
Redish has responded that in the absence of agreed-upon empirical measures, institutional
factors are the best way to resolve the debate. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at
236, with Redish, supra note 60, at 330.
173. Neuborne, supra note 75, at 1120-21.
174. Michael Wells, Against an Elite FederalJudiciary: Comments on the Report of the
Federal CourtsStudy Committee, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 923, 947, 953-54. Wells' overriding
concern is maintaining the federal courts as a forum for claims by individuals with few
resources who are suing government bureaucracies and other large institutions. Id. at 95455. Flooding the federal courts with complex tort cases will push such cases still further
back in the queue. State courts are the better forum for mass tort cases despite-even
because of-the likelihood of large, though primarily nongovernmental, institutions as defendants. See infra text accompanying notes 315-16.
175. See Neuborne, supra note 75, at 1121.
176. Id. at 1123.
177. Id. at 1125.
178. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JusTIcE 65-71 (1969).
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The theory of federal-state allocation of governmental power further supports keeping the federal courts free to concentrate on federal
claims, while leaving state courts in charge of tort cases. Federal
judges earn their political independence by filling their role as a check
on the overwhelming legislative and executive power of the national
government. By contrast, state judges interpreting state law need less
power, and it is entirely appropriate to have political incentives-such
as elections-for the faithful performance of their duties, including
development of the law.1 7 9 Indeed, the very vulnerability to political
pressure that makes state courts less effective at enforcing federal law
makes them better expositors of tort law.18 0
Several prominent commentators have argued that the abstention
doctrine permits federal judges to frustrate the objectives that Congress meant to achieve by assigning jurisdiction to the federal
courts. 81 Abstention is almost entirely a federal common law development premised on state interests. 18 If federal courts hinder the national interest by abstaining from exercise of jurisdiction that
Congress intentionally assigned to them, they commit as great a sin by
neglecting cases within their traditional jurisdiction because their
dockets are clogged with complex state law mass torts.
179. Federal judicial independence therefore ought to play a role in the proper allocation of federal and state jurisdiction:
The federal government's potential monopoly power was much in the thinking of
the framers of the Constitution, and one of the checks they set up against it...
was the independent judiciary with its lifetime tenure and secure (except for inflation) compensation. This costly check-it is costly to have a body of officials
insulated from the usual incentives to efficient performance-would have less social value at the state level, where the power to be checked is not nearly as great.
So it is not a surprise that the terms of employment of state judges (most of whom
are elected) are indeed less conducive to judicial independence .... Since we
thus have a body of judges, the federal judges, who-not adventitiously but for
reasons derivable from the theory of federalism-have... greater independence
from political influences, we should in deciding how to allocate responsibilities
between state and federal judges take the federal judges' greater independence
into account. It is a factor intrinsic to the theory.
POSNER, supra note 55, at 173 (emphasis in original).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 57-86.
181. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers,and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984) ("[N]either total nor partial judge-made abstention is
acceptable as a matter of legal process and separation of powers, wholly apart from the
practical advisability of either form of the doctrine."); see Ann Althouse, The Misguided
Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Penzoil v.
Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 1051,1086-87 (1988) (arguing that federal courts should abstain
only when doing so advances federal interests); Althouse, supra note 85, at 1525-27 (contending that federal interest in effective functioning of states should guide withholding or
application of federal jurisdiction); Hickman, supra note 114, at 1255.
182. See Redish, supra note 181, at 76, 78-79.
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Professor Bator, in his spirited defense of federal-state judicial
parity, never denied that federal judges have institutional advantages
in federal law cases due to their expertise in federal statutory and constitutional interpretation and their insulation from politics. 183 Moreover, although he argued with force that state courts are often as good
at constitutional interpretation as federal courtsi' he did not challenge the proposition that federal courts are better at federal constitutional and statutory interpretation than they are at anything else,

notably at interpretation of the state common law of torts. 85 Even if
the federal courts are better at applying state common law than state

courts are, they should still specialize in federal law interpretation because they make better use of their time doing that than applying state
law.' 86 The comparative advantages of the two systems dictate that
the federal one should specialize in federal law interpretation while

the state one should engage in state statutory interpretation and 187
the
development of common law in tort and other private law areas.
The tort cases merely serve as distractions from the core function
of the third branch of national government.
In a time of scarce re183. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation,22 Wm.
& MARY L. REv. 605, 623 (1981) (granting assumption).
184. Id. at 630-31.
'185. Indeed, Bator stated that his central concern was "the proper role of state judges
in deciding issues offederal law." Id. at 608 (emphasis in original). He distinguished diversity cases and others in which the court is interpreting state law. See id. at 607 n.9. Notably, two other authorities who fall on the pro-parity side of the debate also stop at the
point of saying that state courts are or may be as receptive to federal constitutional and
statutory claims as federal courts. Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional
Litigation in Federaland State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). They do not deny that federal courts are better suited for
federal law adjudication than for state court adjudication, or that federal judges' time is
better spent on federal law rather than state law cases.
186. See Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of Survey and
Implicationsfor Reform, 15 LAW & Soc'y REv. 749, 773 (1981) (stating with regard to
diversity jurisdiction, "abolitionists might well grant the divergence of quality between federal and state courts, and yet claim that diversity cases do not present legal issues worthy of
federal court resources."). Id.
187. This argument of comparative advantage is loosely analogous to the economic argument for complete specialization by trading partners in that activity in which each has
the comparative, rather than absolute advantage. See generally MORDECHAI E. KREINN,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICs: A POLICY APPROACH 188-90 (1971) (describing economic

theory of comparative advantage).
188. Restrictive interpretations of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)
and its predecessors have had the important function of allowing the federal courts to
concentrate on important federal cases and keeping those courts from getting clogged with
personal injury claims. William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case
Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 890, 911-12 (1967); see Alleva,
supra note 73, at 1557 ("[Ihe [Merrell Dow] Court's jurisdiction denial did serve the im-
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sources, when the federal court system can never expect to deal with
more than a fraction of the entire judicial activity of the United
States,1 8 9 the federal courts should only exercise jurisdiction "where

everything is to be gained and nothing is to be lost by granting original
jurisdiction to inferior federal courts." 190 When Judge Friendly
sketched out this "minimum model" of federal jurisdiction, he included those cases in which the United States was seeking to enforce

federal civil and criminal law, suits against the United States, admiralty cases, and bankruptcy, patent, and trademark cases. 191 Friendly
also noted an "almost universal agreement" that federal courts should
have broad powers to hear cases arising under federal constitutional
and statutory provisions, particularly under the civil rights laws. 192
Judge Posner's optimal scope of federal jurisdiction applies concepts
of federalism and comparative political independence of judges to include federal statutory cases in which federal legislation or administration of state law by federal courts would correct state externalities:
tort suits against the United States and many federal criminal cases,
most admiralty cases, and cases 1involving
assertions of rights by mem93
bers of politically weak groups.
portant federal interest in relieving federal docket pressures, an interest that probably figured into the Court's rationale.").
189. The fraction is about one-tenth. FCSC, supra note 5, at 4.
190. FRmNDLY, supra note 54, at 8.
191. Id. at 9-11.
192. Id. at 75, 109. Friendly thought serious restrictions ought to be placed on the timing and subject matter of private civil rights actions in federal courts, id. at 90-107, but felt
that the federal courts had no more important business than enforcing civil rights laws in
cases brought by the United States government. Id. at 68 n.10. He favored legislation
giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over air crashes, apparently on the ground that
only federal courts could consolidate the proceedings brought by multiple claimants. Id. at
110. As indicated below, that premise is dubious. See infra text accompanying notes 24065.
193. POSNER, supra note 55, at 175-81. In recent years, few others have attempted to
create complete blueprints for assertions of federal court power. Notable, however, is Professor Amar's position, which is that federal judicial power ought to extend, either at the
trial or appellate level, to every class of case listed in Article III of the Constitution. Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separatingthe Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985). Amar's unusual interpretation of Article MIplaces
ultimate responsibility for the protection of federal rights on one or another tier of federal
courts. Id. at 207-10. Because the position advanced here places responsibility for protection of state rights, rather than federal rights, on state courts, it is not inconsistent with
Amar's position. Although Congress could place many mass tort cases under the diversity
umbrella, Amar would not require Congress to do so. Under Amar's interpretation, diversity cases may, but need not be, heard by one or another federal court. Id. at 245-46 &
nn.130-31, 269. In fact, Amar proposes that any increase in the caseload of the federal
judiciary caused by adoption of his position could be offset by restricting diversity. "Once
Article III is properly understood, it is clear that permissive diversity cases should yield to
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Both of these minimum models apply federal judicial power to
cases that the state courts could be expected to judge less ably than
their federal counterparts, those in which the United States government's own interest is of overriding importance, and those in which
the political insulation of federal judges gives them needed impartiality that state judges lack. Absent from the list are tort cases, ordinary
or complex. The only justifications for assertion of federal jurisdiction
over these cases are externalities, which have already been discussed, 194 and jurisdictional and practice barriers, which are no justification at all. 195 Allocating federal jurisdiction to complex cases
controlled by state law draws resources from the cases that a federal
court system must resolve for the good of the nation.
The misallocation is exacerbated by the reality that the federal
judges, under Erie, cannot develop a body of mass torts law apart
from their predictions of state decisions, however inadvisable that development might be. It would "'badly squander the resources of the
federal judiciary"' to apply them to state law mass torts in a way that
"precludes the attainment of one of a judge's most important functions, namely 'to establish a precedent and organize a body of
law.' "196
Moreover, federal judges, particularly the many whose previous
careers were spent as government attorneys, may be inexperienced in
state tort and insurance law. Their judicial experience will give them
expertise in federal criminal procedure, in the interpretation of the
United States Constitution, federal statutes, and federal regulations, 197 but only passing familiarity with state tort law. Expansion of
jurisdiction over mass tort cases would give the federal judges more
exposure, but the cases will remain a minority of their dockets. And
even if district court judges are familiar with the tort law in the states
in which they sit, the members of the circuit appeals panels will often
be drawn from other states and will lack whatever specialized expertise the lower courts may have.
mandatory federal question jurisdiction." Id. at 269. His ideal system of trial jurisdiction
and appellate review is one in which "state courts are the last word on state law; federal
courts, on federal law." Id. at 270.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 154-59.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 240-316.
196. FPJENDLY, supra note 54, at 143 (quoting Judge J. Skelly Wright, The Federal
Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. Rnv. 317, 323 (1967)).
197. REDIsH, supra note 170, at 2 ("[F]ederal courts have developed a vast expertise in
dealing with the intricacies of federal law, while the state judiciary has, quite naturally,
devoted the bulk of its efforts to the evolution and refinement of state law and policy.").
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In addition, some efficient means of handling complex cases may
be forbidden to the federal courts by the requirements that cases be
tried only by Article III judges and decided by juries. Once a case is
within federal jurisdiction, a duly-appointed judge with life tenure and
salary protection must preside over the case.198 If the case falls within
the traditional areas of the common law or is sufficiently analogous in
its form and relief, the Seventh Amendment requires a jury. 9 9 These
principles mean that a district judge cannot assign individual trials on
damages or exposure to toxic products or conditions to a magistrate or
other judicial officer without the parties' consent; a jury will need to
be empaneled in each case. A defendant who wants the caseload burden itself to stall or abort the imposition of liability0 0 will withhold
consent to a non-Article III judge, and will insist on a jury. Techniques of sampling and statistical projection have great promise in
easing the burden of deciding individual exposure and damage questions.20 1 In sampling, some plaintiffs' cases will be fully adjudicated
and then serve as models for settlement and voluntary adjudication of
others' claims. However, both Article III and the Seventh Amendment are thought to confer personal rights on the individual, 2°2 which
may conflict with the nonconsensual use of these techniques in a federal forum.
State use of magistrates and other auxiliary adjudicators varies, 20 3
but states are at least free to add ordinary judges to the ranks when
needed without facing a federal constitutional obstacle to laying them
off later. 04 Jury trial rights also vary from state to state, but many
198. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (construing the Magistrates' Act
to avoid a constitutional conflict by holding that it does not authorize a magistrate to preside over jury selection in felony trial without the defendant's consent).
199. Granfinanciera, S.A., et al. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
200. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (reasoning that holding individual trials for all asbestos cases in district would be impossible,
preventing plaintiffs' access to the courts).
201. Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The UnrecognizedBenefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 826-39
(1992).
202. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (stating that Article III confers a "personal right"); see also In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d
706 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting mandamus against federal district court's use of sampling and
statistical inference to determine awards in mass asbestos case).
203. Compare DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: Tim CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 78-79 (1985) (describing use of magistrates in New Jersey)
with ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, ILLINOIS MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION 14
(1991) (describing limits on use of masters in Illinois).
204. Federal judges have life tenure and their salaries cannot be decreased while they
are in office. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
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states retain a much greater range of flexibility in the use of juries or
non-jury fact finders.2 5 Traditional judges and juries should be involved in trying individual questions of exposure or damages, but
states have an advantage in handling complex tort cases because they
may delegate more issues when appropriate.
H.

State Court Consolidation: Advantages and Opportunities

Aggregating cases from courts now in various states into a single
state court forum carries the judicial economy and consistency advantages of federal consolidation. These advantages flow from consolidation itself. Consolidation in a state forum, however, may confer
additional advantages from new doctrinal developments and recently
improved procedures for handling complex cases in several states.
Moreover, improvements in state judicial systems that would facilitate
just adjudication of complex cases may be easier to obtain than expansions of federal jurisdiction.
A. The Advantage of Transfer and Consolidation
The flaws in the idea of consolidation in a federal forum should
not obscure the real benefits of consolidating individual cases into
larger proceedings. The primary benefit is efficiency. Multiple cases
to resolve the same factual and legal issues entail multiple costs to
litigants, attorneys, witnesses, and courts. The advantage of consolidation is a familiar one, and was a primary impetus behind the liberal
joinder and class action provisions of the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as well as the still more liberal 1966 revisions. The
objective was to make single proceedings out of multiple lawsuits.20 6
Besides eliminating duplication, consolidation can also enhance efficiency by allowing greater opportunity for the use of sampling
techniques. 0 7
A secondary advantage of aggregation is a greater likelihood of
consistent results in factually similar cases. The same factfinder is
205. See ICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW & PRAcnc 11-12 (1986) (collecting

cases).
206. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("Under
the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged."); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974) ("The
purpose of [Fed. R. Civ. P. 20] is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits. Single trials generally tend to
lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned.").
207. Saks & Blanck, supra note 201, at 850-51.
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more likely to be consistent with itself than multiple factfinders would
be with each other. Uniformity of result in mass tort cases is a major
selling point for proponents of a federal common law of products liability.208 Nevertheless, consistency may be real or false. Differences
in law that affect liability or damages for various plaintiffs should yield
different, not similar, results in their cases.20 9 Consolidation of cases
in the appropriate state forums- promotes uniformity of result when
the facts and the applicable law are the same, while permitting the
difference in result that different state law causes. The disuniform results will enable states' voters and politicians to make more informed
choices whether and how to modify their tort law. 1
Even efficiency should not be pursued too far. Individual fairness 211 and participation interests212 may work in the opposite direction, as do some diseconomies of scale. Depending on the situation,
consolidation into several proceedings, rather than a single one, may
best meet the combined goals of efficiency, appropriate consistency,
fairness, and participation.21 3 Nevertheless, the haphazard consolidation now available under the federal class action rule, the federal
208. See Vairo, supra note 108, at 178-81.
209. Moreover, two inconsistent decisions, one of which is correct, would be better than
two consistent decisions which are erroneous on the facts or the law. The appearance of
justice matters, but the reality of justice matters more.
210. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 78, at 632, 635.
211. See Transgrud, supra note 6, at 69.
212. Id. at 70-76; see Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation,
70 CORNELL L. Rnv. 779, 816-31 (1985) (elaborating argument). Nevertheless, if the
gridlock produced by the multitude of individual cases keeps all but a few from coming to
trial, plaintiffs as a group are far worse off than if they suffer some decrease in autonomy
and individual attention. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666 (E.D.
Tex. 1990) (reasoning that the defendants' demand for individual trials for all asbestos
cases in district would prevent most plaintiffs' access to the courts). Moreover, the sampling and aggregation techniques available in combined litigation may improve the quality
of individual decisions, not diminish it. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 201, at 826-39.
Finally, although mass proceedings may be expected to influence the substantive law, there
is no reason to believe that the influence will be bad. Mass harm is the reality of mass
society; law should be molded to deal appropriately with it. See generally Scott, supra note
106, at 337-71 (discussing the impact of class actions on the development of rules of liability
in securities cases).
213. Some concern may exist about the risk that parallel proceedings will result in multiple awards of punitive damages for the same conduct by a single defendant. See Kevin M.
Forde, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases: Recovery on Behalf of a Class, 15 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 397, 398 (1984). Courts may reduce the damages in light of other punitive damages verdicts, however. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitigation, 56 CAL. L. RPav. 116, 136-137 (1968) (citing Ostpowitz v.
Wm. S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21 (Sup. Ct., Westchester
County, N.Y.), appeal docketed sub nom. Ostpowitz v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (App.
Div., 2d Dep't, Apr. 26, 1967)).
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transfer statutes, and abstention and preclusion doctrines diminish
fairness and participation without obtaining the full advantages of
consolidation.214 The federal class action rule is drafted to exclude
ordinary tort cases. Even if it were revised, changes in jurisdiction
statutes would be needed to make it a true consolidation vehicle.
These changes, as noted above, would be unwise. Section 1404 of Title 28 merely permits suits to be transferred to places they could have
been brought in the first place, which may not be a single forum. Section 1407, in practice, is more flexible, but, once again, federal consolidation is full of difficulties. Preclusion was once thought to hold great
promise as a means of promoting efficiency, but the reluctance of
courts to apply preclusion in tort cases has limited its value.215 A federal court may abstain in favor of parallel activity in other federal
courts or in the state courts, but this voluntary action does not guarantee the accumulation of those suits that ought to be heard together in
the forum where they most logically would be heard. Enhanced state
court consolidation would be preferable.
B. Capabilities of State Forums
State forums will frequently be those in which mass tort cases
most logically would be heard. Nevertheless some question remains
whether state courts are capable of hearing them and rendering fair
decisions. A range of recent developments that have improved state
courts' capacity to resolve mass tort cases suggests that they are.
216
Many state courts have adopted case management procedures,
some of which compare favorably with federal court procedures for
214. See Transgrud, supra note 212, at 782-83 (rejecting some currently available means
of consolidated treatment of mass torts).
215. Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its
Promise:An Examination ofEstoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. Rnv. 141, 147-52,
172-78 (1984); see Schroeder, supra note 11, at 928, 931-32; John P. Burns et al., Special
Project"An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and PoliticalIssues Raised by Asbestos Litigation,
36 VAND. L. RPv. 573, 660, 666-90 (1983) (collecting and discussing cases).
216. HENSLER, supra note 203, at 76-78; see Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry,
219 Cal. App. 3d 9 (1990) (describing management procedures in complex tort case); Paul
D. Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision-PracticalAspects of New York DES Litigation, 55
BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 883, 896 (1989) (describing New York court's use of management order, uniform discovery, and assignment of all cases to a single judge in consolidated mass
tort case, though noting that state judges had less experience with mass litigation than
federal counterparts and state rules lacked some provisions conducive to mass litigation);
Franklin M. Zweig & Hazel A. White, Courts Eagerfor Tools to Manage and Adjudicate
Science Cases, STATE JusT.INST. NEWS, Winter 1993, at 4 (describing specialized courts for
toxic torts and other cases involving complex scientific evidence in New York City and
Philadelphia); see also WmLLAm E. Hwn-r rT AL., COuRTS THAT SUCCErED: Six PRo~mus
OF SUCCESSFUL COURTS V-XV (1990) (noting case management initiatives in large urban
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handling complex cases. One example is New Jersey, where a report
from the mid-1980s told that magistrates supervised discovery and
judges handled trials in complex asbestos cases under a rigid schedule
of plans and reporting. 217 At the same time, the federal court in New
Jersey, faced with reluctance by judges to accept transferred cases and
to supervise discovery aggressively, was "at a standstill in dispositions.1218 Joinder has been liberalized in many states to facilitate consolidation.219 State class action rules are in place2m and may be more
amenable to mass tort claims than the federal class action rule. 21
States have successfully used bifurcation of issues2 and trial of representative cases2m to dispose of complex tort litigation. States have
also established deferral registries for claims that are not yet rip e. 4
Although deferral enhances both justice and efficiency, 2' federal
courts may lack the authority to take this step.226
State courts have acquired extensive experience in complex injury and environmental suits. What is thought to be the most complex
civil toxic-waste lawsuit ever heard in an American court is currently
courts that conduct general judicial business efficiently). Some states have set procedures
for designation, assignment, and subsequent handling of all types of complex litigation.
E.g., CAL.CODE JUD. ADMiN. § 19 (West 1991).
217. HENSLER, supra note 203, at 78-79, 103.
218. Id. at 100-01.
219. See, e.g., N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. 601 (McKinney 1990).
220. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc.L. & R. 901-09 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1993); see also
James M. Klein, An Overview of Class Actions in Ohio, 20 CAP. U. L. Rnv. 909 (1991)
(describing practice under Ouio R. Crv. P. 23).
221. CompareFed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note ("A 'mass accident' resulting
in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action [under Rule
23(b)(3)] . . . .") (1966) with Schreibman v. Linn, 415 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1979) (applying class action procedures to injury cases against doctor).
222. Theodore Goldberg & ""be A. Brett, Consolidation of Individual PlaintiffPersonal Injury-Toxic Tort Actions, 11 J.L. & COM. 59, 63 (1991) (discussing separation of
liability and punitive damages from other issues in consolidated asbestos proceeding in
West Virginia courts); see Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 463 N.E.2d 792, 808-10 (il.
Ct.
App. 1984) (approving severance of some damages issues in complex environmental disaster case).
223. See Henry J. Reoke, Asbestos Makers Lose Big Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 18
(describing jury findings for three of six "sample plaintiffs"); see also Alex Dominguez,
Nation's LargestAsbestos Trial Opens, CHi. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 10, 1992, at 1 (describing start of trial of six representative cases, to be followed by "minitrials" of other
plaintiffs).
224. See, e.g., Bums v. Celotex Corp., 587 N.E.2d 1092 (111. App. 1992); In re Asbestos
Cases, 586 N.E.2d 521 (IMI.App. 1991).
225. Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: DeferralRegistries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 541, 542 (1992).
226. See id. at 581-93 (discussing legal objections to federal courts' establishing deferral
registries, though concluding that the courts have the authority).
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pending before a state judge in California. 227 A Maryland Circuit
Court heard the largest civil asbestos trial in the country, with 8,555

cases consolidated into it, in 1992.2 8 An action with more than 700
consolidated asbestos cases recently proceeded to partial settlement

and partial adjudication in New York.229
Procedural uniformity may be an advantage of federal consolidation over consolidation in the state courts, but that argument cannot
be pressed too far. Not only is there a trend towards uniformity in
state practice rules,230 but there are significant disuniformities in federal practice. Part of the disuniformity stems from the federal courts'
practice tending to resemble local state court practice.23 1 A more po-

tent centrifugal force in federal practice is the recent proliferation of
local practice rules.232 Most recently, the Civil Justice Reform Act has
spawned advisory groups to propose civil justice expense and delay
reduction plans, which may turn the proliferation of variant local rules
into an explosion. 233 Of course, differences between state and federal
practice that stem from state initiatives to facilitate handling mass tort
cases are hardly an advantage of federal consolidation.
C. Political Considerations

The various calls for expanded federal court jurisdiction over
consolidated mass tort cases all would require Congressional action.
Congress, however, will not necessarily be persuaded by the same policy concerns that may move academics and judges. Perhaps the role
of legal commentators is not to predict the likelihood of political success for their proposals, but anyone advocating a reform must make a
227. The suit has about 4,000 plaintiffs, fewer than those covered by the Agent Orange
litigation in the federal courts in the 1980s, but it involves more than 200 chemicals, making
it more technologically complex than the Agent Orange suit. Nick Madigan, Largest-Ever
Toxic-Waste Suit Opens in California, N.Y. Tunes, Feb. 5, 1993, at B9.
228. See Asbestos Makers Lose Big Trial,supra note 223. The celebrated Cimino asbestos litigation in the federal courts involved consolidation of 3,031 cases. Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
229. In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 572 N.Y.S. 2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
Comparably large consolidated asbestos cases have been heard in other states. See
Goldberg & Brett, supra note 222, at 61 (reporting experience of lawyer with eight trials in
several West Virginia courts, each trial involving ten to nearly 2,000 cases).
230. See Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging ProceduralPatterns,137 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1999,2030,2044 (1989).
231. See id. at 2044 ("The country is too large and the judges, local rules, and legal
cultures too diverse to permit the [full] advertised uniformity [of federal practice].").
232. Id. at 2019-26.
233. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MN.M L.
Rav. 375, 379-81 (1992).
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rough prediction of what is likely to succeed politically if only to determine where to expend scholarly resources.

Recent experience suggests that political resources would be better spent supporting reforms aimed at enhanced state court consolidation rather than expanded federal mass tort consolidation efforts.
Proposals to expand federal consolidation gain their strongest support
among elite groups of lawyers and politicians, but fail when they confront more broadly representative bodies. The American Bar Association proposal sailed through committee, but could not command a
majority among the House of Delegates; even a resolution to support
legislation for federal consolidation of mass accidents failed to pass 3 4

House Bill 3406 succeeded in the House Judiciary Committee but
failed on the Senate floor.3 5 The costs of federal consolidation proposals fall on specific groups and individuals, while judicial economy
benefits the United States population as a whole. Consequently, only
a strong consensus on terms of a proposal will enable it to survive the
36
legislative process3
Important special interest groups fear federal consolidation.
Consumers worry that it is the first step to a federal torts or products
law that would diminish liability and curtail incentives for safety. Trial
lawyers fear decreases in liability, but they are also concerned about
the impact on practice, even if the underlying law were to remain unchanged. Federal courts are often thought to be the domain of large
firms, rather than solo or small-firm practitioners. 37 Many lawyers
prefer the state courts, which they know intimately, rather than the
sometimes forbidding federal tribunals. 38

234. At the 1990 mid-year meeting of the ABA, the backers of the Mass Tort Commission's report withdrew their request for adoption of the report. The ABA membership
then rejected a resolution to support legislation similar to the H.R. 3406. Geyh, supra note
41, at 410; see also Hearings,supra note 126 (letter from L. Stanley Chauvin, President,
American Bar Association, to Judge Joseph F. Weis).
235. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 9, at 559-60.
236. Geyh, supra note 41, at 404 ("As long as complex-litigation reform maintains a low
political profile, and pressure to pass legislation of some sort is therefore limited, the most
likely outcome-in the absence of a consensus as to how best to proceed-will be in a
decision not to move forward, for want of time, interest, and expertise.").
237. Not surprisingly, at non-elite law schools, the enrollments for state civil practice
courses far surpass those for the federal courts course.
238. Bumiller, supra note 186, at 770 ("An expressed preference for state or federal
procedures seems to be related to the experience of the attorney."); PosNER, supra note
55, at 143 ("[L]awyers sometimes will steer a case to the court system with which they
happen to have more experience.").
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Unless there is a change in underlying law, the concerns of the
consumers seem groundless.3 9 The concerns of trial lawyers and
small-scale practitioners are merely an expression of self-interest. The
real reasons to oppose federal consolidation are the concerns about
institutional competence, democracy, and allocation of resources. But
the existence of widespread concern matters, even if the concerns are
misplaced. If federal consolidation will not succeed, or will succeed
only at a tremendous political cost, politicians will abandon it. Reformers should explore other ways to obtain the same advantages.
Solving the apparent problems of state court consolidation may be the
best way.
II.

State Court Consolidation: Problems and Solutions

A number of existing procedural doctrines may make interstate
transfer and consolidation into state forums troublesome. Nevertheless, law reform efforts, many of them already well underway, will
ease nearly all of these difficulties. The problems are both doctrinal
and practical.
A.

Doctrinal Problems of State Court Consolidation

Some problems with interstate transfer and consolidation derive
from outmoded or otherwise troublesome legal doctrines. These include territorial limits on personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens
restrictions, choice of law, possible jurisdictional conflicts among
states, and potential conflict with the Constitution's interstate compacts clause and the Tenth Amendment. Although the problems are
vexing, they are amenable to resolution either at the judicial or legislative level.
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and TerritorialAuthority

If a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over anyone outside its
boundaries, it will face insurmountable obstacles trying to consolidate
a national products injury case; it will have difficulties even with a
mass disaster case when one or more of the actors is an out-of-state
entity. This problem is the main reason that reformers argue for federal, rather than state, consolidation.2" Nevertheless, both state law
239. Of course, if, as Professor Mullenix suggests, federal consolidation requires the
creation of federal tort law, the consumers should have very real concerns about that law's
content.
240. E.g., ABA, supra note 3, at 25; Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 9, at 539. The
ALI proposal does not rely explicitly on this proposition.
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and federal constitutional law can be, and are being, modified to make
territorial jurisdiction an insignificant barrier.
Although state law may limit territorial authority of state courts,
the restrictions are subject to reform efforts by legislatures and by the
courts themselves. A trend exists to expand the authority to the
boundaries set by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some states have done so by legislation,24 1 others by judicial
interpretation of vaguely-worded long-arm statutes.242 Legislatures
and courts who want to retain control over the development of their
own tort law have a significant incentive to permit broad territorial
jurisdiction in mass tort cases. Otherwise parties could be forced by
jurisdictional constraints to litigate the same matter elsewhere.
Federal constitutional restrictions on state court jurisdiction are
also amenable to reform. A general trend towards expansion of state
court jurisdiction began almost as soon as the ink was dry on Pennoyer
v. Neff.243 Through the expansion of in rem jurisdiction and the development of concepts of implied consent and corporate presence, courts
have eroded state sovereignty-based restrictions. 244 The interests of
the states and the goal of efficient functioning of the judicial system as
a whole have justified the expansion. 245 The Supreme Court has cited
judicial efficiency in upholding broad territorial jurisdiction in state
court class actions. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 246 the Court
noted that plaintiffs involuntarily brought into a suit do not have as
strong an objection as defendants involuntarily brought to another ju241. E.g., CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5
§ 2-209 5/2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. R4:4-4 (West 1992); R.I. Gen. L. § 9-533 (1985); see FLEMINGJAMES JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.16, at
80 (3d ed. 1985) (describing trend).
242. Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ill. 1957) (stating that purpose of long-arm
statute was to extend jurisdiction to due process limits), limited, Green v. Advance Ross
Electronics Corp., 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (IlL. 1981), reinstated, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 735,
para.5 § 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1978)
(giving broad reading to New York long-arm statute).
243. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
244. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569, 578 (1958); Mark C. Weber,
Purposeful Availment, 39 S.C. L. REv. 815, 824 (1988); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
200-05 (1977); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Or. REv. 241, 272-81 (describing expansion of state jurisdiction under traditional reasoning).
245. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). But see id. at 251 (cautioning that
not all restrictions on personal jurisdiction will fall).
246. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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risdiction, and held that general procedural due process is the touchstone for analysis.2 47
Furthermore, according to many authorities, the due process limits on state courts apply equally to federal courts. 2' Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(f)'s limit on federal court service of process has prevented this objection from receiving full development in the courts,
but a federal consolidation procedure with nationwide service of process would draw the fire. If the question comes down to one of fairness, convenience, or even reasonable expectations based on past
practice, the limits on personal jurisdiction of a state or federal court
should be the same for any consolidated proceeding.24 9
Consolidation in a single state court may require other state
courts to render themselves inhospitable to claimants who would
rather sue there. State courts may impose restrictions on the free
choice of litigants. The state creates the cause of action, and may provide that it arises only when the plaintiff observes procedures such as
submitting to the jurisdiction of a different state. The Supreme Court
has held that states may limit the scope of tort liability by analogous
means, such as tolling rules that depend on service of process, 25° or
immunities that limit the classes of permissible defendants.5 Waiver
of jurisdictional objections to counterclaims is another widely accepted condition of plaintiff's filing a cause of action in a state's
courts. 52 States interested in promoting a rational system of state
court consolidation should require as a precondition to filing suit that
the litigant has been excluded from a consolidated action in another
state that plaintiff could conveniently join.
247. Id. at 808-12; see Weber, supra note 244, at 838 n.119, 864 (discussing merger of
territorial jurisdiction and general procedural due process analyses in Shutts).
248. E.g., Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations
on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VIL- L. REv. 1 (1988); Pamela J. Stephens, The Federal
Court Across the Street ConstitutionalLimits on FederalCourtAssertions ofPersonalJurisdiction, 18 U. RicH. L. REv. 697 (1984); see Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1065 (discussing
territoriality objection to federal class action).
249. Shutts supports this proposition by merging the analysis of territorial objections of
plaintiffs with their general procedural due process objections. See sources cited supra
note 247. The latter objections apply with equal force to consolidation of proceedings in a
federal forum.
250. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (case decided under Erie doctrine); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (same).
251. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
252. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (enforcing judgment on counterclaim). A
comparable, widely-recognized requirement is submission to business licensing laws. See
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (applying doctrine in diversity case
under Erie).
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States may not subject causes of action to procedures that unfairly deny notice and hearing rights.5 3 Thus interstate transfer and
consolidation procedures will still need to accommodate geographic
considerations that compromise the ability to appear and prosecute
one's case.2S4 The due process requirements in this context should be

no different than those that would apply to federal courts consolidating complex litigation.55 In either case, travel costs that would defeat
the right to present one's case violate due process. In either case re-

ducing the duties of the distant plaintiff would prevent a violation of
6
due process5
In Burnham v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a

state's power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant within its
territory.5 7 Burnham, however, does not present an obstacle to state
court consolidation of mass tort cases. Burnham may mark a return to
sovereignty reasoning in cases that consider the scope of state court
territorial authority. The plurality opinion stated that continuously
observed traditional rules of territorial jurisdiction-which state sovereignty underlies-satisfy due process?5 8 This reasoning does not
give rise to any valid objection to interstate transfer and consolidation.
If the objection is based on sovereignty, the state court, as the organ
of the sovereign, may waive it by agreeing to transfer the case to another forum. While the individual litigant does not have power to
waive the sovereign's prerogative.2s9 the sovereign itself does.260 Sov-

ereignty doctrine is often thought of as a restriction on the reach of
state courts. Whatever effect Burnham has on sovereignty doctrine,

however, the application in that case actually expanded the jurisdic253. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980).
254. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809-10 (1985) (discussing absent
class member's burdens in light of due process standards).
255. In Societ6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958), the Supreme Court confirmed that due process protects the right of a plaintiff to sue for monetary relief in the federal courts. In that case, the
Court found that dismissal for failure to produce documents that plaintiff was not able to
produce would violate the Federal Rules. Id. at 212.
256. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (approving certification of nationwide plaintiff class action).
257. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
258. Id. at 609-10.
259. The inability of the defendant to waive the objection of the sovereign was the
Supreme Court's original reason for rejecting sovereignty as the basis for limits on territorial authority. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694,701-03 n.10 (1982); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 n.13 (1985).
260. See Schroeder, supra note 11, at 970 (stating that agreement between states permitting transfer of cases would eliminate any sovereignty-based objection to jurisdiction).
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tion of the state court by giving broad approval to transient service of
process.2 61 Indeed, the opinion declares that continually-used traditional exercises of jurisdiction satisfy due process, without saying anything about what fails to satisfy due process.2 62
Moreover, a majority of the Court has not embraced the return to
sovereignty ideas. A group of justices of equal size to that endorsing
the plurality opinion in Burnham relied on concepts of fairness to support the assertion of state court jurisdiction in the case.263 Fairness
concepts would make the application of territorial restrictions uniform
in the state and federal courts. Those ideas would also allow for an
expansion of jurisdiction to accommodate serious interests of the state
and the judicial system, such as state court consolidation of mass tort
cases.
An alternative possibility for achieving the same result of expanded state court territorial authority would be for Congress to authorize nationwide service of process for state courts handling mass
tort cases. Congress has authorized nationwide service in some actions brought under federal jurisdiction that is concurrent with state
court jurisdiction.2 4 Courts are divided whether this congressional
action overrides restrictive state long-arm statutes or expands the
state jurisdiction otherwise available under the minimum contacts
test.2 65 Because minimum contacts applies only to defendants,26 and
the test is flexible to accommodate interests like consolidation, minimum contacts should not create a serious difficulty.
2. Forum Non Conveniens and Venue

The state law of forum non conveniens has undergone major
changes in the last generation so that it now will rarely present a serious obstacle to interstate consolidation of mass torts. The country's
third-largest state has effectively abolished forum non conveniens.2 67
261. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628.
262. Elsewhere, the author of the Burnham opinion has approved the use of a government interests-individual fairness calculus in determining whether newly-established adjudicatory procedures satisfy due process. Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105,2123 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
263. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
264. E.g. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 77v (1988); Investment Advisors Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1988).
265. David Carlebach, Note, Nationwide Service of Process in State Courts, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 223, 247-49 (1991) (discussing cases).
266. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
267. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1024 (1991).
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Other states have greatly liberalized the doctrine, in recent years. 268
State venue law may impose some restrictions, although venue laws
that permit suit to be heard where any properly joined defendant is
found 269 will hardly present serious obstacles to the location of controversies with many defendants. Unlike current federal statutes, state
law does not necessarily require that cases transferred in-state be tried
where they could have been brought in the first instance.270 Of
course, both forum non conveniens and venue are subject to legislative revision by the states. The legislatures might adopt broad rules
only for consolidated cases without otherwise disrupting the restrictions currently in place.
3.

Choice of Law

Most proposals for federal consolidation include a federal uniform choice of law standard. Actions consolidated into a single, national magnet forum all but require a single choice of law. It is hard to
imagine a jury keeping straight fifty, or even a dozen, different legal
rules to be applied to different plaintiffs on different issues presented
at trial. No federal choice of law rule exists, however, and present
doctrine under the federal consolidation statutes requires the application of the choice of law rules of the state in which the transferred
action was filed, guaranteeing a multiplicity of rules in a consolidated
action. Hence, the reformers propose the creation of a single rule for
consolidated federal cases. 27 '
268. Smith v. Board of Regents, 302 S.E.2d 124,125-26 (Ga.Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
forum non conveniens doctrine did not apply in Georgia); Kassapas v. Akron Shipping
Agency, Inc., 485 So. 2d. 565 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that forum non conveniens did
not apply in absence of statute); Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 356 A.2d 506, 510 (Vt.
1976) (limiting forum non conveniens dismissals to cases of vexatious conduct); see Stein,
supra note 77, at 1974 ("Several states have completely eliminated discretionary dismissal
of certain actions on the ground of forum non conveniens."); see also David W. Robertson
& Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in TransnationalPersonal Injury Cases: Forum
Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEx. L. Rav. 937, 950-52 (1990) (discussing
trends and noting tendency of international litigation to flow to states that have limited or
abolished the doctrine). But see Werner v. Werner, 526 P.2d 370,378 (Wash. 1974) (reinstituting forum non conveniens after its rejection in Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
338 P.2d 747 (Wash. 1959)).
269. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5 § 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
270. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) (permitting transfer of case to location in which
it could have been filed) with ILL. Sup. CT. R. 187 (permitting unlimited transfer of case on
grounds of forum non conveniens).
271. One significant source of opposition to the federal consolidation proposal is the
necessary adoption of a uniform choice of law rule, and its likely uniform application to
different groups of plaintiffs in a consolidated action. See Sedler & Twerski, supra note 78,
at 626.
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State courts, of course, have their own choice of law rules, and
are quite experienced with applying them. Thus if consolidation takes

place by means of state courts simply rejecting cases when the litigants
can join in ongoing litigation in another state, there would be no need
for a uniform choice of law rule. However, it may be that state courts
could never obtain the greatest practical advantage from consolidation of similar litigation unless they accept cases transferred from
other state or federal forums. Even in this instance, the states need
not adopt the same choice of law rules. The application of another
state's choice of law would be another factor for litigants to consider if
their transfer decision is to be voluntary, and another for the judge to
consider if it were compulsory. In either case, the scope of consolidation may diminish somewhat, but one should not ignore the advantage
of consolidating one thousand cases into one in each of a dozen interested forum states. Moreover, manageability may be greater in a
dozen consolidated cases that go along in parallel than in one giant
case in a single forum. If one were willing to accept the drawbackslargely the damage to federalism-of a uniform choice of law, 272 Congress could create one for state courts to use when they handle transferred or otherwise consolidated mass tort cases. 273

State courts should have no more difficulty applying other states'
law in mass tort cases than they do in other cases. But a serious problem lies in the fact that the courts of one state will need to apply, and
thus necessarily to develop, foreign states' law, negating some of the
will-of-the-majority and adaptation-to-local-conditions advantages of
state, rather than federal, transfer and consolidation. If it is undesirable to have federal judges, even those drawn from the state, developing a state's mass tort law, it is also unwise to have judges of another
state developing the law.
The short response to this objection would begin by noting the
strong tendency among states using the Restatement (Second) of Con272. See id
273. This view thus differs from that put forth by Professors Sedler and 1werski, who
find overruling of Klaxon Co. v. Stentlon Elec. Mfg.. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) to be a prime
objection to extant consolidation proposals. Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The
Case Against All Encompassing FederalMass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73
MARO. L. Rv. 76, 86 (1989). Sedler and Twerski do not consider the possibility that the
choice of law rule imposed by a uniform system could be complex enough to accommodate
different states' interests by treating their citizens differently than those of other states,
Uniformity of result might be disuniform with regard to categories of persons who rationally ought to be treated differently. A choice of law rule of this type would of course be
less uniform, and substantially more difficult to apply, than one that guarantees that the
same state's law covers all parties in the proceedings.
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flict of Laws to apply their own law to issues of liability and damages
in tort cases.274 If no mechanism exists to transfer cases from state
court to state court around the country, state courts should feel free to
apply their own law to the consolidated cases of all those who opted to
sue within the forum. This should occur even if the choices were constrained by other states discouraging the litigants from filing in those
forums..
A somewhat more elaborate response would apply if states
adopted a transfer and consolidation mechanism: the mechanism they
adopt should take the tendency to apply forum state law into account.
More specifically, cases should be sent to a given state largely on the
basis of whose law would apply to the case under the state's choice of
law rules. Erroneous predictions could be remedied by remand or
further transfer to a different state forum. This idea is not as farfetched as it might seem. Courts frequently frame separate subclasses
in class action litigation on the basis of the law to be applied to the
subclass.2 75 A mechanism for interstate consolidation might divide a
mass tort case along similar lines and transfer particular groupings of
plaintiffs and defendants to different states according to the law to be
applied in the cases. Uniformity of result would suffer in comparison
to that found in cases consolidated into a single proceeding in a single
forum, but the disuniformity may be appropriate given the identity of
the various groups of parties 2 76 Even if state courts would need to
develop other states' mass tort law in some instances, an elected state
judge is still a better expositor of tort law than a life-tenured judge
from the federal system.
4. Interstate Conflicts in the Assertion of Jurisdictionand Application
of Binding Effect

There are two basic means by which enhanced consolidation of
mass tort cases in state courts could be achieved. In the first, each
state would act independently to improve its ability to handle complex
tort litigation, increasing its willingness to take jurisdiction of cases
filed within its borders and consolidating them into single proceedings
in an appropriate state trial court. At the same time, the court would
use door-closing doctrines to discourage the filing of cases that would
detract from the efficiency advantages of ongoing mass tort suits in
274. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERTANDING CONFLIers OF LAWS § 69(a)(2), at 201 (1984).
275. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note

25, at 217.
276. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 78, at 635-36.
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other states, creating incentives for the plaintiffs in the cases to join
those suits. Cases that otherwise might be heard in federal court
could be kept from that forum if the federal courts made sensible use
of abstention doctrines.
In the second approach, the states would create an interstate
compact and adopt a uniform law to permit the voluntary or compulsory transfer of cases filed in one place to magnet forums handling
consolidated proceedings in the other state. This latter option could
also be accomplished by Congressional action, at least if the state voluntarily opted to participate in the plan.
The first option has a significant advantage in not requiring any
formal concerted action by the states, nor any intervention from
Washington. States can simply work towards it on their own. Efficiency gains will be lost during the period of drift, and the efficiency
gains will never by quite as great as those of a more formal system, but
few expenditures, political or otherwise, would be necessary to bring
the transition about. Indeed, the mere continuation of existing trends
should lead to it.
The disadvantage of this approach is that some state courts might
resist the trend and issue rulings asserting jurisdiction when both efficiency and fairness dictate that the court should decline to hear the
case in favor of another forum. An injunction by one state of the
proceedings in another state risks triggering an injunction by the second state against proceedings in the first.2 77 When parallel proceedings go ahead in two states, existing full faith and credit law holds that
the first valid judgment binding the parties is the effective one.2 78 Parties vying for the advantages of different forums might thus engage in
a race to, and a race through, the courthouse to gain the first valid
judgment.
The widespread state adoption of some doctrinal reforms might
minimize these jurisdictional conflicts, however. This independent action by states would move towards a true system of interstate consolidation of mass tort cases in the state courts. Currently, the law in
many jurisdictions provides that an action will abate if there is a prior
pending action between the same parties on the same cause of action.2 79 Courts could facilitate interstate consolidation by expanding
277.

KENNm H. YORK, ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 152 (5th ed. 1992).
278. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256 (1958).
279. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10(c) (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 735, para.5 § 2-619(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3211(a)(4) (McKinney 1992). In the federal system, this doctrine takes the highly discretionary form of
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this doctrine to allow abatement or dismissal of the action when a case
exists elsewhere against the same defendant and plaintiff conveniently
can join his or her cause of action in the proceeding. Courts could
also induce interstate consolidation with the careful use of forum non
conveniens doctrine. 80 As has been discussed, this doctrine has
weakened in recent years, facilitating consolidation of mass torts in
state forums. A modification of the doctrine would help consolidation
more than abolition would, however. The courts should consider the
existence of an action the plaintiff conveniently could join when they
determine whether to grant the defendant's motion for dismissal
under the doctrine. 281 The absence of actions elsewhere and the likelihood that other parties could conveniently join the action under
challenge should be reasons to deny the motion to dismiss.
States could transform this tentative promotion of interstate consolidation into a real system of interstate transfer by adopting the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act,282 which permits the transfer of all or
part of a suit brought in one state to the courts of another state.283
The grounds for transfer are simply that the transfer "serve the fair,
effective, and efficient administration of justice and the convenience
of the parties and witnesses."'' As drafted, the law applies both to
multiparty and simple proceedings, but a relevant factor in the transfer decision is "the public interest in securing a single litigation and
disposition of related matters." 28 The law expands the personal jurisdiction of the court receiving the litigation to incorporate the jurisdiction of the transferring court.286 Whether the states will voluntarily
adopt this provision is unclear. Currently, only one state has2 adopted
the law, although several more have it under consideration. 8
ColoradoRiver abstention. See Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
280. See supra note 267-70 and accompanying text.
281. Under current law in New York, for example, the presence of litigation that could
be joined would appear to be a relevant factor in the dismissal decision. See N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 327(a) (McKinney 1983). Domicile or residence of a party in the state does
not preclude dismissal. Id.; see Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 278 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 1972).
282. 14 U.L.A. § 78 (Supp. 1992).
283. Id. at § 101.
284. Id. at § 104.
285. Id.
286. Id. at § 203; see id. at § 101 cmt.
287. South Dakota has enacted the bill. S.D. H.B. 1337 (enacted Mar. 13, 1992). Legislators have introduced bills in Kansas, S.B. 62 (introduced Feb. 11, 1992), Nebraska, L.R.
319 (introduced Mar. 25, 1992) (studying enactment), Virginia, H.B. 834 (introduced Jan.
23, 1992), and West Virginia, S.B. 588 (introduced Feb. 17, 1992).
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Fear that these reforms would not be widely adopted or that they
would not be effective may counsel for a second form of consolidation, one that has a more formal mechanism backing it. One such
mechanism would be the creation of a panel of judges from various
states issuing orders about which cases should be transferred and consolidated with which other cases to what courts. 28 An interstate compact or act of Congress would be required for this latter initiative. It
would also require an organization to administer the system once
created.
An even more elaborate device would be the actual creation of a
multistate court,2 9 but this has little advantage over mechanisms that
simply steer the cases to state forums that can handle them. It also
has some of the drawbacks of federal consolidation: judges who are
not responsible to the voters of a state will be developing and applying
the state's law and may need to have some universal choice of law
standard for the mega-consolidations that would occur.
A third proposal, a kind of compromise between the two principal choices of relying on independent state action and creating an interstate or federal bureaucracy, might follow the model of the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Section 1738A of Title 28 requires states to enforce, and not to modify, child custody determinations made by the courts of other states, when those courts have
properly asserted jurisdiction under the Act.2 90 By requiring full faith
and credit be given to these determinations, the Act induces parties to
join in a single proceeding in a logically chosen jurisdiction. Application of this model to mass tort cases would require Congress to pass a
full faith and credit provision compelling dismissal of tort cases that
could be joined with actions in other states that had properly been
determined to meet the statutory criteria for magnet proceedings.
288. This is essentially the proposal of the American Law Institute, which is appended
to the ALI's proposal for transfer of federal and state cases to the federal courts and consolidation there. ALI, supra note 2, ch. 4, at 205; see also Schroeder, supra note 11, at 96366 (making a similar proposal); Conway, supra note 11, at 1107-08 (proposing that Federal
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transfer litigation for consolidation in state
courts).
289. See Resnick, supra note 11, at 56.
290. Proper assertions of jurisdiction are those of the court of a state which is the child's
home state on the basis of a residency test; which meets a connections, best interests of the
child, and convenience test when there is no home state; which is the state of temporary
residence under emergency conditions; or which meets a best interests test when no other
state court meets the other tests or the courts of a state that meets.the test have declined
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1988). See generally Christopher L. Blakesley, Child
Custody-Jurisdictionand Procedure,35 EMORY L.J. 291 (1986) (discussing Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 116-170 (1979)).

270

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 21:215

Nevertheless, the model of § 1738A may not be ideal. Because it
confers jurisdiction on the first state to properly assert it, § 1738A
both encourages races to the courthouse and fails to guarantee that
the forum obtaining jurisdiction is the optimal one to decide the action. 'Moreover, § 1738A has received mixed reviews about its ability
to operate without a private cause of action to enforce it in federal
court,2 91 which the Supreme Court found that Congress did not intend
to confer.292 If the § 1738A model were adopted, Congress would be
well advised to add an effective remedy in an impartial tribunal, and
perhaps to modify the standard so that being first to assert jurisdiction
does not necessarily grant control. Mediation of competing state assertions of jurisdiction under a new full faith and credit law would be a
more appropriate role for the federal courts than monopolizing the
development of substantive state tort law.
Each of the principal models for state court consolidation of mass
torts thus has its advantages and drawbacks, as does a compromise
between the two. Considerations of competence, federalism, and allocation of resources, combined with realistic observations of state
courts' abilities, still dictate that any of these proposals would be superior to consolidation of mass tort cases in federal courts.
5. Federal ConstitutionalObjections

An agreement among states permitting interstate transfer and
consolidation may face doctrinal difficulties under the interstate compact clause of the United States Constitution.2 93 Although the interstate compact clause appears to require congressional approval of all
agreements between states, the Supreme Court has limited the scope
of the provision to include only those arrangements that add a new
political presence between the state and the federal governments or
increase the states' basic sphere of authority. 9 An interstate agree291. See Andrea S. Charlow, JurisdictionalGerrymanderingand the Parental Kidnapping PreventionAct, 25 FAM. L.Q. 299 (1991) (contending that denial of federal jurisdiction
undermines Act); Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A CriticalReexamination of the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and the ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 845 (1992) (criticizing effectiveness of Act); Steven M.
Schuetze, Note, Thompson v. Thompson: The JurisdictionalDilemma of Child Custody
Cases under the ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 409 (1989) (doubting effectiveness of Act if states do not adhere, in absence of federal remedy).
292. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
293. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State .... ).
294. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 479 (1978); see
JoiiN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITrIONAL LAW § 9.5(a), at 316 (4th ed.
1991).
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ment to transfer cases, even if it entails a panel of judges from different states to preside over the transfers, does not alter federal-state
power relationships in such a way as to require congressional approval
under the compact clause. 95
Congressional action to promote transfer and consolidation in the
state courts might conceivably face a Tenth Amendment2 96 objection.
Nevertheless, if the congressional act merely permitted states to vol297
untarily participate in the system, the law would face no difficulties.
Although the Supreme Court has recently held unconstitutional a federal regulatory effort that required state legislative or executive action
and left no choice to the state,298 the Court has permitted Congress to
impose significant involuntary law-enforcement obligations on the
state courts under the authority of the Supremacy Clause and the
Constitution's implicit understanding that state courts would be a primary means to enforce federal law.299
B. Practical Problems of State Court Consolidation
Beyond doctrine, there are practical problems to a regime of
transfer and consolidation in the state courts. Nevertheless, two of the
most serious problems, practice rules differences and uneven judicial
personnel, are amenable to solution. They do not present difficulties
any worse than those faced by federal courts in consolidated
proceedings.
1.

Differences in Practice Rules

Although practice rules differ from state to state, the differences
are not so great that they would present insurmountable obstacles to
interstate consolidation. As noted above, though practice from state
to state has grown more uniform in recent years, federal practice has
blossomed into a multitude of different forms 00 The Civil Justice
Reform Act will increase federal multiplicity.3"' At the state level,
295. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 969-70. Reciprocal legislation merely making courts
of one state enforce duties that are owed in another state does not require congressional
approval under the compact clause. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959).
296. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or

to the people.").
297. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to law withholding federal subsidies unless the states engaged in voluntary action).
298. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
299. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
301. See generally Mullenix, supra note 233.
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there are only two basic regimes, one that is similar to the Federal
Rules, and the other that has grown out of the Field Codes adopted in
the mid-nineteenth century.30 2 Even between the two systems, significant aspects of practice overlap. For example, liberal discovery is a
hallmark of the Federal Rules, but code states now have discovery
rules that are similar to the federal ones.3 0 3 Pleading standards, once
thought to be a major difference between practice influenced by the
federal rules and code practice, now show close similarity between
federal courts and the courts of many code states.3 4
2.

Corruption and Incompetence

Corruption and incompetencet may continue to worry litigants
subject to consolidation of their cases before a state judge. The problem is smaller than imagined, however. The tort system now relies
largely on state judges; the only danger of consolidation is placing
greater responsibility in the hands of a single judge. 5 The uneven
quality of some states' judicial personnel also reflects the range of jobs
that state judges perform. 6 State courts of general jurisdiction hear
only eight percent of state court cases; 3 0 7 the quality of judges in traffic, small-claims, and family courts that hear the other ninety-two percent do not affect the desirability of consolidation of mass tort claims
in state courts of general jurisdiction. State supreme courts and court
administrators may be expected to choose the judges receiving the
consolidated cases with some care. 8 Moreover, incompetence and
302. See JACK H. FRiEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 238 (1985)
(describing pleading).
303. LOUISELL, supra note 53, at 902.
304. Whereas states have moved towards notice pleading standards, the federal courts
have moved towards code pleading. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Underthe FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. Rnv. 433, 435-36, 444-51 (1986);
see also John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules in State Courts:A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WASH. L. Rnv. 1367, 1426 (1986) (on pleading
policy, finding "important similarity to the Federal Rules in two-thirds of the states.").
305. This statement may not be entirely accurate, for there may be an opportunity for
better adjudication foregone if the proposals for federal consolidation are not adopted.
Nevertheless, any advantage from using federal judges for these cases will be outweighed
by the cost to other federal caseload priorities, as well as the harm to federalism and related interests.
306. VICrOR E. FLANGO, ET. AL., THE BusmNESS OF STATE TRIAL COURTS 76 (1983).
307. Id.
308. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Braten, 420 N.Y.S.2d 584,587 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (describing
administrative judge and administrative assignment committee system of designating particular judges for complex litigation); ILL. Sup. C. R. 384 (establishing means of selecting
single circuit for consolidated multi-circuit case).
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corruption are hardly unknown among federal judges, °9 and life tenure makes dishonest or bumbling federal judges extremely difficult to

weed out.
An additional consideration is the strong effort by many states to

train and assist their judiciaries, particularly in the handling of mass
tort cases. One state has produced a judges' manual for complex litigation, with an entire chapter devoted to mass tort cases. 310 At least
twenty-four states have judicial evaluation programs in some stage of
operation.31 ' The State Justice Institute, which provides financial support to projects improving the administration of justice in the states,
has given priority to establishing procedures for the selection and removal of judges, and for the education and training of judges and
other court personnel. 312 From 1987 to 1992 the Institute funded 183
training projects, most at levels in excess of six figures.31 3 Because
enhancing the capacity of the state courts to handle consolidated mass
tort cases will benefit the federal court system by freeing the federal
courts' time, it is entirely appropriate for the federal government to
fund projects to improve the state judiciary's ability to handle the
suits. Given the current fiscal problems of many state governments,
further judicial improvement projects may well depend on increases in
federal funding.3 14

Finally, trying consolidated mass tort cases in state court systems
may induce politically powerful forces such as organized trial lawyers,
309. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 732 (1993) (case arising from impeachment of federal judge for perjury); Hastings v. United States Senate, 492 U.S. 930 (1989)
(impeachment case of federal judge for bribery).
310. See ILLiNois JuniciAL CONFERENCE, supra note 203.
311. Conference Examines Judicial Performance Evaluation, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
Crs. REP'T, July, 1991, at 1. Some have argued that states have gone too far in subjecting
judges to attorney evaluation. E.g. Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of
FederalJudges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 668 (1969) (discussing
evaluation in California).
312. Final Grant Guidelines Fiscal Year 1993, STATE JUST. INST. 1992 at 13.
313. Id. at 89-101. Among the projects are a $183,500 effort to strengthen state court
capacity to adjudicate toxic torts cases, and numerous programs on handling complex trials. Id. at 92-94. Total grants awarded in fiscal year 1992 exceeded $11.6 million. SJI
Awards More than $1L6 Million in FY "92,STATE JusnTcE INsT. NEWS, Winter 1993, at 2.
Appropriations are in danger for fiscal year 1994, however. STATE JusrIcE INsTrrUTE
NEWS, Spring 1993, at 1.
314. David Bailey, Pinch-Penny Justice: Courts Are Struggling To Get By, Make Do,
Cmr. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 24, 1993, at 1. The federal courts are hardly better suited to
handle additional caseload responsibilities, however. See Richard Carelli, Fiscal "Train
Wreck" Seen for FederalCourts, Cr. DAmy L. BuLL., Mar. 17, 1993, at 1: FederalCourts
May HaltNew Civil Jury Trials Due to Lack of Funds, Cm. DAiLy L. BULL., Mar. 31,1993,
at 1.
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associations of manufacturers, and insurers to push for further improvement of the state courts.315 Recently, a group studying an urban
juvenile court suffering from inefficient and irregular procedures suggested recruiting associates from large law firms to represent parties
in proceedings there in order to increase the visibility of problems and
generate political pressure for reform.316 If improvement is needed in
the courts that receive consolidated mass tort cases, the persons with
the greatest stake in improvement will be among those most able to
obtain it. Assigning mass tort cases to the federal courts would diminish the quality of justice in that system, but adding the cases to the
states' dockets would be likely to cause an increase in the quality of
state judicial performance.
Conclusion
Federal jurisdiction should not be treated as the default option in
the consolidation of mass tort proceedings. Efficiency gains of consolidation can be obtained without violence to federalism by use of the
state courts. The values of federalism are important ones: experimentation, adaption to local conditions, and popular participation. There
is no good reason to displace the elected judiciaries of the states in a
role they perform well and can perform even better if doctrinal and
practical reforms are made. Use of the state courts would be a better
allocation of scarce adjudicatory resources, and would strengthen the
states in an area in which constitutional structures give them independence. At the minimum, the alternative of state consolidation deserves the serious discussion that consolidation in the federal courts
has received.

315. See Neuborne, supra note 75, at 1130 n.88 (predicting that if diversity jurisdiction
were ended, business interests would obtain improvements in quality of state courts).
316. Tripp Baltz, ChicagoBar Association Tackles a Problem Child: Juvenile Court,CGi.
LAWYER, Oct. 1991, at 4; see Helen Lucaitis, New ChiefJudge of Juvenile Court in Hurry to
Begin Tackling Long-Time Problems, Cm. DALY L. BULL., Mar. 3, 1992, at 2.

